Embrace experimentation in biosecurity governance

Evans, Sam Weiss; Beal, Jacob; Berger, Kavita M.; Bleijs, Diederik A.; Cagnetti, Alessia; Ceroni, Francesca; Epstein, Gerald L.; García-Reyero, Natàlia; Gillum, David; Harkess, Graeme; Hillson, Nathan J.; Hogervorst, Petra A. M.; Jordan, Jacob L.; Lacroix, Geneviève; Moritz, Rebecca; ÓhÉigeartaigh, Seán S.; Palmer, Megan J.; Passel, Mark W. J. van

doi:10.1126/science.aba2932

Cited by 23 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…The impact on global health and the world economy of the current SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has brought into sharp focus this unmet need. As a result of this SR and other work conducted in parallel, along with others (Evans et al, 2020 ), we propose the increase of “ethical hacking” (Pashel, 2007 ) as a way to move away from reactive changes (implemented after major events occur) to proactive governance in health security and biosecurity. We suggest this can be achieved by applying the hacker ethic of Information Technology in the Life sciences, to iteratively test the boundaries and experiment on new synthetic biology technologies, generating a dynamic understanding of their security limitations.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 58%

A Systematic Review of the Criminogenic Potential of Synthetic Biology and Routes to Future Crime Prevention

Elgabry

Nesbeth

Johnson

2020

Front. Bioeng. Biotechnol.

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Synthetic biology has the potential to positively transform society in many application areas, including medicine. In common with all revolutionary new technologies, synthetic biology can also enable crime. Like cybercrime, that emerged following the advent of the internet, biocrime can have a significant effect on society, but may also impact on peoples' health. For example, the scale of harm caused by the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic illustrates the potential impact of future biocrime and highlights the need for prevention strategies. Systematic evidence quantifying the crime opportunities posed by synthetic biology has to date been very limited. Here, we systematically reviewed forms of crime that could be facilitated by synthetic biology with a view to informing their prevention. A total of 794 articles from four databases were extracted and a three-step screening phase resulted in 15 studies that met our threshold criterion for thematic synthesis. Within those studies, 13 exploits were identified. Of these, 46% were dependent on technologies characteristic of synthetic biology. Eight potential crime types emerged from the studies: bio-discrimination, cyber-biocrime, bio-malware, biohacking, at-home drug manufacturing, illegal gene editing, genetic blackmail, and neuro-hacking. 14 offender types were identified. For the most commonly identified offenders (>3 mentions) 40% were outsider threats. These observations suggest that synthetic biology presents substantial new offending opportunities. Moreover, that more effective engagement, such as ethical hacking, is needed now to prevent a crime harvest from developing in the future. A framework to address the synthetic biology crime landscape is proposed.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 58%

A Systematic Review of the Criminogenic Potential of Synthetic Biology and Routes to Future Crime Prevention

Elgabry

Nesbeth

Johnson

2020

Front. Bioeng. Biotechnol.

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“…Given the inherent limitations of anticipation, in order to make steps forward, some forms of learning by doing cannot be avoided. That could for instance mean that researchers, developers, and regulators work together to develop, test, and assess how different safety-oriented design approaches and dedicated governance arrangements for warranting safety and security fare in different contexts and to investigate how best to adapt such approaches in response to both lessons learned and evolved circumstances [ 83 ].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Safe-by-Design in Engineering: An Overview and Comparative Analysis of Engineering Disciplines

Gelder

Klaassen

Taebi

et al. 2021

IJERPH

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In this paper, we provide an overview of how Safe-by-Design is conceived and applied in practice in a large number of engineering disciplines. We discuss the differences, commonalities, and possibilities for mutual learning found in those practices and identify several ways of putting those disciplinary outlooks in perspective. The considered engineering disciplines in the order of historically grown technologies are construction engineering, chemical engineering, aerospace engineering, urban engineering, software engineering, bio-engineering, nano-engineering, and finally cyber space engineering. Each discipline is briefly introduced, the technology at issue is described, the relevant or dominant hazards are examined, the social challenge(s) are observed, and the relevant developments in the field are described. Within each discipline the risk management strategies, the design principles promoting safety or safety awareness, and associated methods or tools are discussed. Possible dilemmas that the designers in the discipline face are highlighted. Each discipline is concluded by discussing the opportunities and bottlenecks in addressing safety. Commonalities and differences between the engineering disciplines are investigated, specifically on the design strategies for which empirical data have been collected. We argue that Safe-by-Design is best considered as a specific elaboration of Responsible Research and Innovation, with an explicit focus on safety in relation to other important values in engineering such as well-being, sustainability, equity, and affordability. Safe-by-Design provides for an intellectual venue where social science and the humanities (SSH) collaborate on technological developments and innovation by helping to proactively incorporate safety considerations into engineering practices, while navigating between the extremes of technological optimism and disproportionate precaution. As such, Safe-by-Design is also a practical tool for policymakers and risk assessors that helps shape governance arrangements for accommodating and incentivizing safety, while fully acknowledging uncertainty.

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“…This means that almost all research carried out in the wake of the pandemic will be both conducted and published without adequate dual-use oversight, underscoring the importance of improved guidance globally ( Table 1 ). Moreover, even when review processes are nominally in place, worrying research may nevertheless be conducted in the absence of robust efforts to implement and evaluate the effectiveness of existing policies ( 12 , 13 ).…”

Section: Perspectivementioning

confidence: 99%

Rapid Proliferation of Pandemic Research: Implications for Dual-Use Risks

Musunuri

Sandbrink

Monrad

et al. 2021

mBio

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Embrace experimentation in biosecurity governance

Abstract: We must rethink and test assumptions about relationships among biological research, security, and society

Cited by 23 publications

References 10 publications

A Systematic Review of the Criminogenic Potential of Synthetic Biology and Routes to Future Crime Prevention

A Systematic Review of the Criminogenic Potential of Synthetic Biology and Routes to Future Crime Prevention

Safe-by-Design in Engineering: An Overview and Comparative Analysis of Engineering Disciplines

Rapid Proliferation of Pandemic Research: Implications for Dual-Use Risks

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