Rapid Proliferation of Pandemic Research: Implications for Dual-Use Risks

Musunuri, Sriharshita; Sandbrink, Jonas B.; Monrad, Joshua Teperowski; Palmer, Megan J.; Koblentz, Gregory D.

doi:10.1128/mbio.01864-21

Cited by 28 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 61 publications

(67 reference statements)

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“…As members of EBRC, we took the publication of a detailed protocol for reconstructing SARS-CoV-2 as a call to catalyze dialogue around the guardrails for research with serious security and/or safety implications . As capabilities within life science research grow, so too does the need for a culture that recognizes the concomitant security risks accompanying rapid development and dissemination. , Despite discussion around security in publishing, little concrete progress has been made toward establishing best practices across journals. We recommend the development of standards that give concrete guidance for authors and editors when evaluating whether to publish findings with safety and security implications.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Making Security Viral: Shifting Engineering Biology Culture and Publishing

et al. 2022

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The ability to construct, synthesize, and edit genes and genomes at scale and with speed enables, in synergy with other tools of engineering biology, breakthrough applications with far-reaching implications for society. As SARS-CoV-2 spread around the world in early spring of 2020, researchers rapidly mobilized, using these tools in the development of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines for COVID-19. The sharing of knowledge was crucial to making rapid progress. Several publications described the use of reverse genetics for the de novo construction of SARS-CoV-2 in the laboratory, one in the form of a protocol. Given the demonstrable harm caused by the virus, the unequal distribution of mitigating vaccines and therapeutics, their unknown efficacy against variants, and the interest in this research by laboratories unaccustomed to working with highly transmissible pandemic pathogens, there are risks associated with such publications, particularly as protocols. We describe considerations and offer suggestions for enhancing security in the publication of synthetic biology research and techniques. We recommend: (1) that protocol manuscripts for the de novo synthesis of certain pathogenic viruses undergo a mandatory safety and security review; (2) that if published, such papers include descriptions of the discussions or review processes that occurred regarding security considerations in the main text; and (3) the development of a governance framework for the inclusion of basic security screening during the publication process of engineering biology/synthetic biology manuscripts to build and support a safe and secure research enterprise that is able to maximize its positive impacts and minimize any negative outcomes.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Making Security Viral: Shifting Engineering Biology Culture and Publishing

et al. 2022

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“…In 1946, the US Atomic Energy act turned all information on nuclear weapons into “restricted data” until formally declassified [ 17 ]. Today, information hazards in the life sciences, i.e., knowledge and insights that can cause harm, are frequently associated with greater dual-use potential than physical materials [ 18 , 19 ]. Advances in molecular biology, including DNA synthesis and gene editing, are democratising science and lowering the barrier to the synthesis and engineering of biological agents [ 20 ].…”

Section: Risks From Biological Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Preprints may therefore increase the probability that dangerous methods or results are described publicly. Preprints challenge any model relying on review by journals at publication [ 18 ], emphasising the need for oversight at other stages in the research life cycle, such as during design and funding. The need to consider preprints in the context of research with dual-use potential has been expressed previously [ 75 ].…”

Section: Preprint Publishing: a Changing Publication Landscape Offers...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Biosecurity in an age of open science

Smith

Sandbrink

2022

PLoS Biol

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The risk of accidental or deliberate misuse of biological research is increasing as biotechnology advances. As open science becomes widespread, we must consider its impact on those risks and develop solutions that ensure security while facilitating scientific progress. Here, we examine the interaction between open science practices and biosecurity and biosafety to identify risks and opportunities for risk mitigation. Increasing the availability of computational tools, datasets, and protocols could increase risks from research with misuse potential. For instance, in the context of viral engineering, open code, data, and materials may increase the risk of release of enhanced pathogens. For this dangerous subset of research, both open science and biosecurity goals may be achieved by using access-controlled repositories or application programming interfaces. While preprints accelerate dissemination of findings, their increased use could challenge strategies for risk mitigation at the publication stage. This highlights the importance of oversight earlier in the research lifecycle. Preregistration of research, a practice promoted by the open science community, provides an opportunity for achieving biosecurity risk assessment at the conception of research. Open science and biosecurity experts have an important role to play in enabling responsible research with maximal societal benefit.

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“…Today, information hazards, [17], i.e. knowledge and insights that can cause harm, are frequently associated with greater dual-use potential than the physical products of research [18,19]. Advances in molecular biology, including DNA synthesis and gene editing, continue to lower the barrier to the synthesis and engineering biological agents [20].…”

Section: Risks From Biological Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Preprints may therefore increase the probability that dangerous methods or results are described publicly. Preprints challenge any model relying on review by journals at publication [18], emphasising the need for oversight at other stages in the research life-cycle, such as during design and funding. The need to consider preprints in the context of research with dual-use potential has been expressed previously [71].…”

Section: Box 1: Preliminary Investigation Into Preprint Policies Reveals Potential Gapsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Open science practices and risks arising from misuse of biological research

Smith¹,

Sandbrink²

2021

Preprint

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The proliferation of open science may inadvertently increase the chance of deliberate or accidental misuse of research. Here, we examine the interaction between open science practices and biosecurity and biosafety to identify risks and opportunities for risk mitigation. We argue that open data, code, and materials may increase risks from research with misuse potential, despite their general importance. For instance, increased access to protocols, datasets, and computational methods for viral engineering may increase the risk of release of enhanced pathogens. For this dangerous subset of research, both open science and biosecurity goals may be achieved by using access-controlled repositories or application programming interfaces. The increased use of preprints could challenge any strategy for risk mitigation that relies on assessment at the publication stage, emphasising the need for earlier oversight in the research lifecycle. Preregistration of research, a practice promoted by the open science community, provides an opportunity for achieving biosecurity risk assessment at the conception of research. Open science and biosecurity experts have an important role to play in enabling responsible research with maximal societal benefit.

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Rapid Proliferation of Pandemic Research: Implications for Dual-Use Risks

Cited by 28 publications

References 61 publications

Making Security Viral: Shifting Engineering Biology Culture and Publishing

Making Security Viral: Shifting Engineering Biology Culture and Publishing

Biosecurity in an age of open science

Open science practices and risks arising from misuse of biological research

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