This paper seeks to compare two frameworks which have been proposed to explain risk perceptions, namely, cultural theory and the psychometric paradigm. A structured questionnaire which incorporated elements from both approaches was administered to 129 residents of Norwich, England. The qualitative risk characteristics generated by the psychometric paradigm explained a far greater proportion of the variance in risk perceptions than cultural biases, though it should be borne in mind that the qualitative characteristics refer directly to risks whereas cultural biases are much more distant variables. Correlations between cultural biases and risk perceptions were very low, but the key point was that each cultural bias was associated with concern about distinct types of risks and that the pattern of responses was compatible with that predicted by cultural theory. The cultural approach also provided indicators for underlying beliefs regarding trust and the environment; beliefs which were consistent within each world view but divergent between them. An important drawback, however, was that the psychometric questionnaire could only allocate 32% of the respondents unequivocally to one of the four cultural types. The rest of the sample expressed several cultural biases simultaneously, or none at all. Cultural biases are therefore probably best interpreted as four extreme world views, and a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research methodologies would generate better insights into who might defend these views in what circumstances, whether there are only four mutually exclusive world views or not, and how these views are related to patterns of social solidarity, and judgments on institutional trust.

This paper seeks to compare two frameworks which have been proposed to explain risk perceptions, namely, cultural theory and the psychometric paradigm. A structured questionnaire which incorporated elements from both approaches was administered to 129 residents of Norwich, England. The qualitative risk characteristics generated by the psychometric paradigm explained a far greater proportion of the variance in risk perceptions than cultural biases, though it should be borne in mind that the qualitative characteristics refer directly to risks whereas cultural biases are much more distant variables. Correlations between cultural biases and risk perceptions were very low, but the key point was that each cultural bias was associated with concern about distinct types of risks and that the pattern of responses was compatible with that predicted by cultural theory. The cultural approach also provided indicators for underlying beliefs regarding trust and the environment; beliefs which were consistent within each world view but divergent between them. An important drawback, however, was that the psychometric questionnaire could only allocate 32% of the respondents unequivocally to one of the four cultural types. The rest of the sample expressed several cultural biases simultaneously, or none at all. Cultural biases are therefore probably best interpreted as four extreme world views, and a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research methodologies would generate better insights into who might defend these views in what circumstances, whether there are only four mutually exclusive world views or not, and how these views are related to patterns of social solidarity, and judgments on institutional trust.

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The "psychometric paradigm" developed by Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein was a landmark in research about public attitudes toward risks. One problem with work, however, was that (at least initially) it did not attempt to distinguish between individuals or groups of people, except "experts" vs. "lay people." This paradigm produced a "cognitive map" of hazards, and the assumption seemed to be that the characteristics identified were inherent attributes of risk. This paper examines the validity of this assumption. A questionnaire survey similar to those designed by Slovic et al. was conducted, but the data were analyzed at both the aggregate level, using mean scores, and at the level of individuals (N = 131 Norwich residents). The results reported here demonstrate that (1) individuals vary in their perception of the same risk issue; (2) individuals vary in their rating of the same risks characteristics on the same risk issue; and (3) some of the strong intercorrelations observed between risk characteristics at the aggregate level are not supported when the same data are analysed at the level of individuals. Despite these findings, the relationship between risk characteristics and risk perceptions inferred by the psychometric paradigm did hold true at the level of individuals, for most--but not all--of the characteristics. In particular, the relationship between "lack of knowledge to those exposed" and risk perceptions appears to be a complex one, a finding which has important implications for risk communication strategies.

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Amid a wider debate over the European Union's democratic deficit, 'science and governance' has attracted particular attention. Science and technology have become a special problem because they are routinely cited as an objective basis for policy. Through dominant models of science and technology, policy frameworks serve to promote and conceal socio-political agendas, while preempting debate on alternative futures. Technological-market imperatives are invoked to mandate a single path towards economic survival. Expert advice is implicitly equated with 'science', in turn invoked as if scientific knowledge were a value-neutral basis for regulatory decisions. This has led to a legitimacy crisis. As governments search for a remedy, rhetorics of openness have been tagged onto the dominant models, rather than superseding them. Consequently, underlying tensions emerge within proposed reforms, as illustrated by the case of agricultural biotechnology. If the aim is to relegitimise decision-making, it will be necessary to change the institutions responsible for promoting innovation and regulating risks, in particular their preconceptions of science, technology and public concerns.

Based on criticism of the “ethical, legal and social implications” (ELSI) paradigm, researchers in science and technology studies (STS) have begun to create and move into “post-ELSI” spaces. In this paper, we pool our experiences of working towards collaborative practices with colleagues in engineering and science disciplines in the field of synthetic biology. We identify a number of different roles that we have taken, been assumed to take, or have had foisted upon us as we have sought to develop post-ELSI practices. We argue that the post-ELSI situation is characterised by the demands placed on STS researchers and other social scientists to fluctuate between roles as contexts shift in terms of power relations, affective tenor, and across space and over time. This leads us to posit four orientations for post-ELSI collaborative practices that could help establish more fruitful negotiations around these roles.

Cultural Theory, as developed by Mary Douglas, argues that differing risk perceptions can be explained by reference to four distinct cultural biases: hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism, and fatalism. This paper presents empirical results from a quantitative survey based on a questionnaire devised by Karl Dake to measure these cultural biases. A large representative sample (N = 1022) was used to test this instrument in the French social context. Correlations between cultural biases and perceptions of 20 social and environmental risks were examined. These correlations were very weak, but were statistically significant: cultural biases explained 6%, at most, of the variance in risk perceptions. Standard sociodemographic variables were also weakly related to risk perceptions (especially gender, social class, and education), and cultural biases and sociodemographic variables were themselves inter correlated (especially with age, social class, and political outlook). The authors compare these results with surveys conducted in other countries using the same instrument and conclude that new methods, more qualitative and contextual, still need to be developed to investigate the cultural dimensions of risk perceptions. The paper also discusses relationships between perceptions of personal and residual risk, and between perceived risk and demand for additional safety measures. These three dimensions were generally closely related, but interesting differences were observed for some risk issues.