Why and how to study Theory of Mind with fMRI

Saxe, Rebecca

doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2006.01.001

Cited by 106 publications

(81 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…By contrast, we think that in real life, mentalizing often occurs in response to verbal stimuli, including both single utterances and extended narratives (43). Moreover, previous studies suggest that mentalizing based on verbal and nonverbal stimuli engages the same ToM neural network (1,9).…”

Section: Reasoning About Beliefs Based On Hearing and Seeing In Eb Andmentioning

confidence: 80%

Growing up blind does not change the neural bases of Theory of Mind

Bedny

Pascual‐Leone

Saxe

2009

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

139

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Humans reason about the mental states of others; this capacity is called Theory of Mind (ToM). In typically developing adults, ToM is supported by a consistent group of brain regions: the bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ), medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), precuneus (PC), and anterior temporal sulci (aSTS). How experience and intrinsic biological factors interact to produce this adult functional profile is not known. In the current study we investigate the role of visual experience in the development of the ToM network by studying congenitally blind adults. In experiment 1, participants listened to stories and answered true/false questions about them. The stories were either about mental or physical representations of reality (e.g., photographs). In experiment 2, participants listened to stories about people's beliefs based on seeing or hearing; people's bodily sensations (e.g., hunger); and control stories without people. Participants judged whether each story had positive or negative valance. We find that ToM brain regions of sighted and congenitally blind adults are similarly localized and functionally specific. In congenitally blind adults, reasoning about mental states leads to activity in bilateral TPJ, MPFC, PC, and aSTS. These brain regions responded more to passages about beliefs than passages about nonbelief representations or passages about bodily sensations. Reasoning about mental states that are based on seeing is furthermore similar in congenitally blind and sighted individuals. Despite their different developmental experience, congenitally blind adults have a typical ToM network. We conclude that the development of neural mechanisms for ToM depends on innate factors and on experiences represented at an abstract level, amodally.

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Section: Reasoning About Beliefs Based On Hearing and Seeing In Eb Andmentioning

confidence: 80%

Growing up blind does not change the neural bases of Theory of Mind

Bedny

Pascual‐Leone

Saxe

2009

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

139

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“…Scenario 2 depicts social interaction as envisaged by extensions of James's ideomotor theory (James 1890;extensions: Prinz 1997, Jeannerod 1999, Hommel et al 2001 and supported by findings on mirroring (Decety & Grezes 1999, 2006Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). The ideomotor approach maintains that individuals perceive others' actions in the light of their own action repertoire (see figure 1c,d ).…”

Section: Scenario 2: Relating To Others Through Action Simulationmentioning

confidence: 88%

“…This work has guided research on social cognitive development towards the study of explicit knowledge about others and has influenced research on the neural underpinnings of mind reading (e.g. Vogeley et al 2001;Saxe 2006;Apperly 2008). One central question of Theory of Mind research has been how individuals reason about one another (e.g.…”

Section: The Role Of Intention In Previous Thinkingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolving intentions for social interaction: from entrainment to joint action

Knoblich

Sebanz²

2008

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

221

150

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This article discusses four different scenarios to specify increasingly complex mechanisms that enable increasingly flexible social interactions. The key dimension on which these mechanisms differ is the extent to which organisms are able to process other organisms' intentions and to keep them apart from their own. Drawing on findings from ecological psychology, scenario 1 focuses on entrainment and simultaneous affordance in 'intentionally blind' individuals. Scenario 2 discusses how an interface between perception and action allows observers to simulate intentional action in others. Scenario 3 is concerned with shared perceptions, arising through joint attention and the ability to distinguish between self and other. Scenario 4 illustrates how people could form intentions to act together while simultaneously distinguishing between their own and the other's part of a joint action. The final part focuses on how combining the functionality of the four mechanisms can explain different forms of social interactions. It is proposed that basic interpersonal processes are put to service by more advanced functions that support the type of intentionality required to engage in joint action, cultural learning, and communication.

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“…However, if we assume the lexicon to contain all linguistic information, then it is necessary to account for a wide distributed network in the brain: the classic Broca and Wernick areas, visual form area (DEHAENE, 2012) for written language, right hemisphere regions for coarse semantic coding (BEEMAN; CHIARELLO, 1998), discourse processing (SCHERER, 2009;MASON;JUST 2006) and pragmatics (SCHMIDT;SEGER, 2009;SAXE, 2006;BAMBINI, 2010), etc. Looking from this point of view, the mental lexicon seems to be more a theory apparatus created to explain language processing, rather than a real structure.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does the mental lexicon exist?

Sousa

Gabriel

2015

RELIN

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Abstract:One of the central and most intriguing components of language processing to researchers is the mental lexicon. The term was used for the first time by Ann Triesman in 1961 and we still do not have clear answers on how it is structured and how much information it contains, or even if there is something to be called a mental lexicon. For some time, the mental lexicon has been compared to a mental dictionary both storing and organizing word knowledge; however, they are surely different in structure and quantity / quality of information. Neuroimaging studies have also tried to bring contributions to these questions. Some researchers believe that there are many lexicons, one for each level of stored information (ULLMAN, 2007): orthographic, phonological, semantic and syntactic lexicons. Another group of researchers (MCCLELLAND; ROGERS, 2003; SEIDENBERG, 1997, etc.) postulates the existence of only one lexicon where all information levels are integrated. Recently, a new Linguagem, Belo Horizonte, v. 23, n.2, p. 335-361, 2015 336 audacious proposal has been done by Elman (2009), the inexistence of a mental lexicon. In this paper, we discuss the different views of the mental lexicon structure and content, in order to question the architecture of the lexical knowledge in the brain as opposed to what can be consciously thought as the speaker's lexical knowledge. We try to proceed on the discussion of Elman's new proposal and confront it to data obtained by behavioral, neuroimaging and computational studies. This theoretical review briefly explains the evolution of the mental lexicon conceptions from the dictionary-like to the no-lexicon proposal. Keywords: linguistic knowledge; mental lexicon; network architecture; language processing; language description. Revista de Estudos daResumo: Um dos componentes mais centrais e intrigantes do processamento da linguagem para os pesquisadores é o léxico mental. O termo foi usado pela primeira vez por Ann Triesman em 1961 e até o momento não temos respostas claras sobre como ele é estruturado e quanta informação contém, ou mesmo se existe algo a ser chamado de léxico mental. Durante algum tempo, o léxico mental foi comparado a um dicionário mental, responsável por armazenar e organizar o conhecimento de palavras; entretanto, certamente há distinções em termos de estrutura e quantidade / qualidade de informação armazenada. Alguns pesquisadores acreditam que existem vários léxicos, um para cada nível de informação (ULLMAN, 2007): léxico ortográfico, fonológico, semântico e sintático. Outro grupo de pesquisadores ROGERS, 2003; SEIDENBERG, 1997, etc.) defende a existência de apenas um léxico no qual todos os níveis de informação estão integrados. Recentemente, Elman (2009) apresentou uma nova e audaciosa proposta: a inexistência do léxico mental. Neste artigo, discutimos as diferentes perspectivas de estrutura e conteúdo do léxico mental com o propósito de questionar a arquitetura do conhecimento lexical no cérebro em contrapartida ao que pode ser conscientemente concebido...

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Why and how to study Theory of Mind with fMRI

Cited by 106 publications

References 52 publications

Growing up blind does not change the neural bases of Theory of Mind

Growing up blind does not change the neural bases of Theory of Mind

Evolving intentions for social interaction: from entrainment to joint action

Does the mental lexicon exist?

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