Which Way to Cooperate

Kaplan, Todd R.; Ruffle, Bradley J.

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02485.x

Cited by 28 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…We have thus checked our result using a lottery for a pair which is considerably closer to the coarse correlated equilibrium in the game and found very similar result. Second, one may ask whether committing to the device (to get higher expected payoffs) increases if the players' relationship were repeated, as each player is then likely to get the higher payoff sometimes (as in Kaplan and Ruffle 2012). We however find no such indication from fixed-match pairs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 61%

“…Arifovic and Jiang (2014) studied the simple bank-run game by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and analysed situations in which sunspots matter through a laboratory study. Kaplan and Ruffle (2012) investigated models of cooperation through a class of two-player games that requires the players to coordinate on which player cooperates and who gets to defect, so as to achieve the socially efficient outcome. Our paper fits well within this literature as well.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Nash versus coarse correlation

2020

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We run a laboratory experiment to test the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium (Moulin and Vial in Int J Game Theory 7:201-221, 1978), with a two-person game with unique pure Nash equilibrium which is also the solution of iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. The subjects are asked to commit to a device that randomly picks one of three symmetric outcomes (including the Nash point) with higher ex-ante expected payoff than the Nash equilibrium payoff. We find that the subjects do not accept this lottery (which is a coarse correlated equilibrium); instead, they choose to play the game and coordinate on the Nash equilibrium. However, given an individual choice between a lottery with equal probabilities of the same outcomes and the sure payoff as in the Nash point, the lottery is chosen by the subjects. This result is robust against a few variations. We explain our result as selecting risk-dominance over payoff dominance in equilibrium.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 61%

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Nash versus coarse correlation

2020

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“…There are also several important differences between the environment studied in the current paper and those considered in the experimental and theoretical literature on cooperative behavior in repeated games (see, for example, Bhaskar (2000), Bjedov et al (2016), Bornstein et al (1997), Cason et al (2013), Evans et al (2015), Kaplan and Ruffle (2012), Kuzmics and Rogers (2012), Kuzmics et al (2014), Lau and Mui (2008), and Lau and Mui (2012)). First, unlike these studies our bargaining environment has no exogenous period structure with simultaneous moves in each period.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence

Luhan

Poulsen

Roos

2017

Games and Economic Behavior

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We conduct a bargaining experiment where interaction is tacit and payoffs are earned and cumulated in real time. We test hypotheses about the interaction between the focal properties of payoffs and the complexity of coordinating on an intertemporal behavior that achieves them. The general finding is that when a payoff focal outcome requires a complicated coordination scheme bargainers tend to settle on a simpler and sometimes inefficient behavior

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“…It can bein fine pointed out that the above matrices could be asymmetric, thus sometimes with complex eigenvalues [23], hence possibly cyclic behaviors. Indeed, so-called alternating and cut-off ways of cooperation can be envisaged [40]. Many developments and much work are obviously ahead.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effects of competition and cooperation interaction between agents on networks in the presence of a market capacity

et al. 2016

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A network effect is introduced taking into account competition, cooperation, and mixed-type interaction among agents along a generalized Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra model. It is also argued that the presence of a market capacity undoubtedly enforces a definite limit on the agent's size growth. The state stability of triadic agents, i.e., the most basic network plaquette, is investigated analytically for possible scenarios, through a fixed-point analysis. It is discovered that: (i) market demand is only satisfied for full competition when one agent monopolizes the market; (ii) growth of agent size is encouraged in full cooperation; (iii) collaboration among agents to compete against one single agent may result in the disappearance of this single agent out of the market; and (iv) cooperating with two rivals may become a growth strategy for an intelligent agent.

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Which Way to Cooperate

Cited by 28 publications

References 33 publications

Nash versus coarse correlation

Nash versus coarse correlation

Real-time tacit bargaining, payoff focality, and coordination complexity: Experimental evidence

Effects of competition and cooperation interaction between agents on networks in the presence of a market capacity

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