When Does Repression Trigger Mass Protest? The 2013 Gezi Protests

The Effects of Selective and Indiscriminate Repression on the 2013 Gezi Park Nonviolent Resistance Campaign

“…Thus, it was predictable that fierce police intervention in the Gezi encampment in the initial stages would galvanize masses of people across the country to join the Gezi protesters. Field interviews of participants would later reveal that this backfire outcome was directly attributable to the government’s use of indiscriminate repression (Atak and della Anisin 2016a; Aytaç et al 2018; Över and Taraktaş 2017; Porta 2016).…”

“…Aytaç et al’s (2018) research is also supported by Defne Över and Başak Taraktaş’s (2017) ethnographic field interviews of 60 protest participants and a survey analysis of 1,352 Gezi protesters. Their findings show that an overwhelming majority of people went to Gezi Park to protest disproportionate police violence against the early Gezi protesters.…”

“…When we turn to studies on nonviolent resistance campaigns, most of the research on this targeting approach is focused on indiscriminate repression where authorities target wide swaths of protesters with violent coercive strategies that generate backfire escalations in dissident mobilization. There are numerous quantitative and qualitative studies that have documented this effect (Anisin 2016a, 2016b, 2018; Aytaç, Schiumerini, and Stokes 2018; Francisco 2004; Hess and Martin 2006; Lichbach 1987; Martin 2007; Nepstad 2011; O’Brien and Deng 2015; Odabaş and Reynolds-Stenson 2018; Över and Taraktaş 2017; Schock 2005; Smithey and Kurtz 2018b).…”

“…Previous research that shows a positive influence of state repression on nonviolent dissent is extensive and this effect is frequently referred to as the “paradox of repression” (Smithey and Kurtz 2018a). 9 In the context of nonviolent resistance campaigns, much of the evidence about the paradox of repression focuses on how and why government repression has a backfire outcome 10 ; in other words, state violence unintentionally escalates rather than diminishes dissident mobilization (Anisin 2016a, 2016b; Atak and della Porta 2016; Brockett 1995; Chenoweth 2018; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Davenport, Johnston, and Mueller 2005; Francisco 2004; Hess and Martin 2006; Mason and Krane 1989; O’Brien and Deng 2015; Ortiz 2007; Över and Taraktaş 2017; Sullivan and Davenport 2017).…”

“…In particular, we focus on the differential effects of indiscriminate and selective repression on the rate of protest actions during the campaign. We aim to show that when the Erdoğan government confronted the dissidents repeatedly with indiscriminate repression, its policy generated an escalation in dissident mobilization or what is commonly referred to as a backfire outcome (Anisin 2016a; Atak and della Porta 2016; Över and Taraktaş 2017). On the contrary, when officials expanded their tactics to include a selective repressive strategy of arrests and detentions that targeted leaders and activists outside of the context of the street protests, they were able to decrease the rate of challenger protest actions significantly.…”