The Effects of Selective and Indiscriminate Repression on the 2013 Gezi Park Nonviolent Resistance Campaign

Abstract

We investigate the differential effects of selective and indiscriminate repression on the rate of protest actions during the nonviolent resistance campaign in Gezi Park, Turkey, in 2013. After deriving theoretical expectations about how and why these forms of repression will influence protest actions, we test them with protest event data that were collected from a major local newspaper and subsequently validated through a comparison with two other independent Twitter datasets. Utilizing a Poisson autoregressive estimation model, we find that selective repression, as measured by the number of arrested activists who were detained while they were not demonstrating, decreased the rate of protest actions. Meanwhile, indiscriminate repression, as measured by the frequency of the government’s use of lethal and nonlethal violence against protesters during demonstrations, increased the rate of protest actions. Our findings support prior research on the influence of indiscriminate repression on backfire outcomes. They also provide evidence for the impact of selective repression on movement demobilization through the removal of opposition activists. Finally, the targeted arrest strategy of selective repression that was employed in the Gezi campaign has implications for the feasibility of the strategic incapacitation model of protest policing.

Mobilization, Repression and Policy Concessions in Authoritarian Regimes: The Cases of Egypt and Jordan

“…More importantly, scholars argue that 'repression that is targeted on certain groups and not others, is most effective because it divides the opposition and pits groups against each other' (Nugent, 2020: 42). A regime's strategy of targeting activist leaders is another way of utilizing targeted repression, as it weakens the power of the movements themselves, and is used as a pre-emptive and provocative way to eliminate activism (Demirel-Pegg and Rasler, 2017). During times of regime crisis or mass mobilization regimes tend to use more indiscriminate and large-scale violence.…”

“…During times of regime crisis or mass mobilization regimes tend to use more indiscriminate and large-scale violence. In Egypt, for instance, the Mubarak regime increased its repressive strategies against protestors during the 18-day uprising of January 2011, which had an adverse effect on mobilization, since more people decided to join protestors (Demirel-Pegg and Rasler, 2017).…”

Religious Support for Civil Resistance Movements: When and How Does It Contribute to Regime Change?

“…Targeted or selective repression occurs when a regime narrowly aims its punitive acts toward key figures. Indiscriminate repression is when the state attacks a broad segment of the population, including movement supporters and sympathetic bystanders (Demirel-Pegg and Rasler 2020; Dugan and Chenoweth 2012; Mason and Krane 1989). I anticipate that religious elite support will matter when repression is indiscriminate.…”

Introducing the Turkey Protest, Repression, and Pro-Government Rally Dataset (TPRPGRD)

“…Increasing scholarly attention to the rise in authoritarianism in Turkey has produced a growing literature on protests and pro-government interactions (Aytaç et al 2018;Özen 2015;Tufekci 2017). This growing interest has spurred systematic data collection to understand the effects of government responses to collective action (Atak 2013;Atak and della Porta 2016;Demirel-Pegg and Rasler 2021;Gümrükçü 2014;Uysal 2017;Arslanalp and Erkmen 2020b). Nevertheless, existing data do not account for the reality that the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi -AKP) government has used PGRs as a response to anti-government mass protests.…”

“…Among these, only Arslanalp and Erkmen's studies overlap with the period of this dataset, but they solely focus on repressive mechanisms within the scope of protest bans. The research exploring the Gezi protests in 2013, on the other hand, provides data only for this limited period (Atak and della Porta 2016;Demirel-Pegg 2020;Demirel-Pegg and Rasler 2021). Third, this research provides a high quantity of coded events, allowing a detailed analysis of contentious dynamics.…”