When do the Dutch want to join the nuclear ban treaty? Findings of a public opinion survey in the Netherlands

Onderčo, Michal; Smetana, Michal; Meer, Sico van der; Étienne, Tom

doi:10.1080/10736700.2021.1978156

Cited by 9 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…The ultimate result of such an absence of public debate is a widespread doubt about the usefulness of nuclear weapons reflected in the public opinion in a number of European countries, including Germany and the Netherlands. Both academic surveys and those conducted by anti‐nuclear weapon activists demonstrated public scepticism about nuclear deterrence, and a substantial portion of the European publics (often over 50%, depending on the survey and country) were in favour of withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe (for an activist survey, see ICAN, 2019; for academic surveys, see Onderco et al, 2021; Onderco & Smetana, 2021; Pelopidas, 2017; Pelopidas & Egeland, 2020; Pelopidas & Fialho, 2019b; Smetana et al, 2021).…”

Section: Nuclear Attitudes Until Nowmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The publics were also rather open to the idea of a withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe, especially in the case of an arms control agreement with Russia. Furthermore, Europeans were rather strongly opposed to the use of nuclear weapons stationed on their territory in a conflict with Russia (see Onderco et al, 2021; Smetana et al, 2021; Smetana & Onderco, 2022a). Similar results were found by the anti‐nuclear weapon civil society, who used the public's opposition to nuclear weapons to bolster the case against NATO nuclear sharing (ICAN, 2021).…”

Section: Russian Invasion Of Ukraine and Nuclear Weaponsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hawks in the making? European public views on nuclear weaponspost‐Ukraine

2023

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In the past, the European public has not been enthusiastic about nuclear deterrence and the stationing of US American nuclear weapons in Europe. Has the Russian invasion of Ukraine changed that aversion? We conducted a unique study, surveying the same population of respondents at two points in time-in September 2020 and in June 2022. We find that European respondents became much more hawkish after the invasion: nuclear deterrence was viewed more favourably, the willingness to use nuclear weapons increased, and support for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons dropped significantly. The paper draws a number of policy implications from these results.

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Section: Nuclear Attitudes Until Nowmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Russian Invasion Of Ukraine and Nuclear Weaponsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hawks in the making? European public views on nuclear weaponspost‐Ukraine

2023

Self Cite

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“…A similar experiment, however, yields different results in Japan, where the Japanese government's negative messages about TPNW failed to sway public opinion against the treaty (Baron, Gibbons and Herzog 2020). Onderco et al (2021) conducted a survey to explore the conditions under which the Dutch public supports membership in the TPNW. They found conditional support for joining the TPNW, with the public preferring to join only if other nuclear-weapon states did.…”

Section: Public Opinion and Nuclear Proliferationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nonproliferation Information and Attitude Change: Evidence From South Korea

Son

Park

2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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What explains the foreign policy gap between elites and the general public on nuclear proliferation? We investigate specific contexts in which experts’ nonproliferation information changes public attitudes toward nuclear weapons development using a novel attitude change experiment. By randomly assigning seven categories of nonproliferation information to pro-armament survey participants, we examine how different types of nonproliferation information affect pro-armament respondents’ opinions and behavioral choices. The results of our experiment demonstrate the enlightening effect of economic sanctions information. After learning about the economic costs and consequences of nuclear weapons development, pro-armament respondents substantially changed their opinion as well as behaviors toward nuclear proliferation. In comparison to economic sanctions information, other types of nonproliferation information (e.g. conditional military punishment, normative sanctions, nuclear technology sanctions, elite or public opposition to proliferation) have limited effects on pro-armament subjects’ attitude changes. These findings are the first to identify the relative explanatory powers of previous explanations for nuclear nonproliferation at the individual level.

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“…In addition, the intensity and breadth of public discussions in democracies also help these NGOs to raise and present their arguments. Given this, governments in democratic countries should be more ready to join ICW treaties in order to respond to the interests and activities of NGOs (for a similar argument on nuclear arms control, see Onderco et al, 2021).…”

Section: Theoretical Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

State commitments and inhumane conventional weapons: An explanatory analysis of treaty ratification

Karlas¹

2022

Cooperation and Conflict

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In the last 40 years, the international community has made considerable progress towards the regulation of inhumane conventional weapons (ICWs) by adopting treaties that regulate or ban these weapons. However, many states have still not joined these treaties or have joined them with a considerable delay. These ratification decisions cannot be satisfactorily explained by the existing literature on the origin of ICW treaties, which stress the role of global socialization processes. This article offers a theoretical argument that explains state decisions on the ratification of ICW treaties. It argues that while democracies and countries located in regions with high ratification rates are prone to ratify ICW treaties, an insecure external environment impedes or delays ratification. The argument also claims that security costs resulting from the characteristics of the individual treaties can modify the effects of these explanatory factors. To provide an empirical test for the argument, the article conducts a survival analysis that covers the ratification processes of the three existing ICW treaties.

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When do the Dutch want to join the nuclear ban treaty? Findings of a public opinion survey in the Netherlands

Cited by 9 publications

References 0 publications

Hawks in the making? European public views on nuclear weaponspost‐Ukraine

Hawks in the making? European public views on nuclear weaponspost‐Ukraine

Nonproliferation Information and Attitude Change: Evidence From South Korea

State commitments and inhumane conventional weapons: An explanatory analysis of treaty ratification

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