When a Precedent of Donation Favors Defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the question of whether a collective activity can influence cooperation in a subsequent repeated one-shot prisoner's dilemma ( PD) game. We conduct two series of experiments. The first consists of control experiments in which 30 periods of a PD game are played, with a random rematching of the pairs in every period. In a second series of experiments, subjects first play a donation game (DG) and then the PD game. In the DG, they collectively discuss the amount of a donation to a given charity, before putting the question to an individual and anonymous vote. Cooperation levels in the PD games preceded by the DG are significantly lower than those observed in the control experiment.JEL classification: C72, C91, C92.

The Effects of Temperature Priming on Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

“…As discussed earlier, Garapin et al (2011) suggest that prior instances of generosity may result in lower levels of generosity at a later date, suggesting a lower frequency of cooperation in the hotfirst condition than the cold-first condition. However, Axelrod and Hamilton's (1981) research suggests the opposite effect.…”

“…Garapin, Llerena and Michel (2011) found that when participants play a game of Prisoner's Dilemma, after playing a donation game, they were less likely to cooperate. This suggests that prior instances of generosity may result in lower levels of generosity at a later date, which may have a significant effect on a repeated measures design.…”

Evidence of Homo Economicus? Findings from Experiment on Evolutionary Prisoners' Dilemma Game

“…In similar fashion, Garapin, Llerena, and Hollard (2010) reports that the average rate of cooperation from four sessions of the game ranged from 15.4% to 29.7% (Table 3). However, Vlaev and Chater (2007) find that the percentage of cooperative games in three different payoff setting are up to 33%, 50%, and 71%.…”

“…The proportion of cooperative strategy is relatively low compared to that of previous experiments such as Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006) and Garapin, Llerena, and Hollard (2010). Their experiments ended with cooperative rate at least 15% and in one session it was close to 30%.…”

“…This may be sensible since players are experiencing new opponent each time and they tend to exercise their rationality. Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006) and GLH refers to Garapin, Llerena, and Hollard (2010). Source: Garapin, Llerena, and Hollard (2010).…”