What the Mona Lisa and a Screwdriver Have in Common

Bahr, Amrei

doi:10.1163/18756735-000057

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…My point is that in some cases the group's conception of the cluster of K-relevant This draws out the close connection between art and artefacts, generally, and indeed I'm assuming that all artworks are artefacts. For discussion of the denial that all artworks are artefacts, see Weitz (1956), Davies (1991), andJuvshik (2021b), and see Bahr (2019) for the relation between the two.…”

Section: Social Dependence Without the Artisan Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the social nature of artefacts

Juvshik

2023

Theoria

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Recent work in metaphysics has focused on the nature of artefacts, most accounts of which assume that artefacts depend on the intentions of their individual makers. Artefacts are thus importantly different from institutional kinds, which involve collective intentions. However, recent work in social ontology has yielded renewed focus on the social dimensions of various kinds, including artefacts. As a result, some philosophers have suggested that artefacts have a distinctly social dimension that goes beyond their makers' individual intentions but which stops short of the collective intentionality of institutional kinds. I aim to combine these insights into an account of artefacts that involves disjunctive conditions of mind‐dependence: Artefacts can either depend on the singular intentions of their makers or they can depend on the collective acceptance of particular social groups. Whether the first or second disjunct is satisfied depends on the artefact's context of creation. I'll argue that this applies not to artefact kinds but to individual artefacts. I then consider two objections to my view based on Robinson Crusoe cases and show how my account allows us to fit artefacts into a taxonomy of social kinds.

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Section: Social Dependence Without the Artisan Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the social nature of artefacts

Juvshik

2023

Theoria

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“…These two pre-theoretical features seem like a plausible package for artifact essences and indeed, they've both received substantial theoretical support. 1 However, just intending to make 1 For discussion of intention-dependence see Hilpinen 1992, Dipert 1993, Bloom 1996, Baker 2007, Levinson 2007, Thomasson 2003, Mag Uidhir 2013, Evnine 2016, Khalidi 2016, Goodman 2020, and Juvshik 2021a For discussion of artifact function see Kornblith 1980, Houkes and Vermaas 2004, Scheele 2006, Elder 2007, Grandy 2007, Soavi 2009, Hughes 2009, Preston 2009, Franssen and Kroes 2014, Evnine 2016, Olivero 2019, Bahr 2019, and Juvshik 2021b. For an overview of artifact essences see Koslicki 2018, ch.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Artifactualization without Physical Modification

Juvshik¹

2021

Res Phil.

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Much recent discussion has focused on the nature of artifacts, particularly on whether they have essences. While it's often held that artifacts are intention-dependent and necessarily have functions, it's equally held, though far less discussed, that artifacts are the result of physical modification of some material objects. This paper argues that the physical modification condition on artifacts is false. First, it formulates the physical modification condition perspicuously for the first time. Second, it offers counterexamples to this condition. Third, it considers, and rejects, two responses to these counterexamples, one which appeals to the distinction between being a K and being used as a K and another which argues that the counterexamples are merely of functional, not artifactual, kinds. Finally, it considers, and rejects, a more general objection that appropriation makes artifact creation too easy. Therefore, artifacts can be created by appropriation and it sketches some success conditions for such appropriation. something to serve some function doesn't seem sufficient for successfully making an artifact. Imagine I intend to make a bowl to serve salad. If I don't do anything to execute my intention to make something to serve salad, then I won't succeed in making a bowl. As a result, intention-dependence and function seem necessary, but not sufficient, to make an artifact. What further condition could be added to yield jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for being an artifact?A further plausible pre-theoretical condition on being an artifact is that they must result from the physical modification of some material things or stuff. To make a salad bowl or a chair, an agent does something -she shapes, fires, and glazes some clay or she cuts, sands, nails, and varnishes some wood. This physical modification condition seems to be borne out by our artifact practices. Shirts result from cotton being dyed, shaped, and sewed. A cake is made by mixing a variety of ingredients and subjecting them to heat. Buildings are complex, technical creations constructed out of diverse materials by multiple coordinating agents. Chairs, pencils, cars, key fobs, cellphones, boots -almost everything that surrounds us in our daily lives -appear to be the result of agents intentionally physically modifying some objects in order to serve some function or purpose. While this physical modification condition is pre-theoretic, many philosophers also hold this view. 2 Despite being intuitive and widespread, no one has given a full defense of the view that artifacts must be the result of physical modification, let alone formulated the condition precisely. Moreover, it may seem subject to easy counterexamples. It's therefore important to see why and how it fails. Thus, my aim in this paper is to show that the physical modification condition on artifacts, or PMC for short, is false. As a result, artifacts can be created by appropriation -pre-existing objects can become artifacts without being physically modified. 3 I also aim to accompl...

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Functions and the Aesthetics of Technical Artefacts

Houkes

2019

Grazer Philos. Stud.

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In this paper, it is examined to what extent functions, as analysed in the philosophy of technical artefacts, can serve a role in explaining the aesthetic appreciation of these objects. The main conclusion is that, despite first appearances, so-called ‘Functional Beauty’ accounts cannot derive strength from analyses of artefact functions; on the contrary, these analyses constrain the possibilities for developing a suitable, function-based account of aesthetic appreciation. The paper follows a conceptual-engineering approach. After presenting desiderata for an account of aesthetic appreciation, relevant insights are reviewed that are drawn from philosophical work on artefact functions. Combining the desiderata and insights, three major issues are identified that complicate the relation between function ascriptions to and aesthetic appreciation of technical artefacts. In closing, options are offered for resolving these complications or avoiding them altogether.

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What the Mona Lisa and a Screwdriver Have in Common

Cited by 5 publications

References 2 publications

On the social nature of artefacts

On the social nature of artefacts

Artifactualization without Physical Modification

Functions and the Aesthetics of Technical Artefacts

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