Functions and the Aesthetics of Technical Artefacts

In philosophy – especially in philosophy of technology and philosophy of art –, several specific accounts of artifact functionality have been developed. These accounts usually have a restricted scope: they are clearly limited to either technical artifacts or entities of art. In this paper, a contrasting account will be developed, which aims at covering both functions of technical artifacts and functions of art works as well as their instances. The paper is in two parts: In the first part, the method of specifying desiderata that Houkes and Vermaas have introduced to develop their theory of technical functions is adopted. Drawing on exemplary (failed) function ascriptions referring to items of art and technology, four desiderata are presented, all of which an account has to meet to provide a convincing analysis of both function ascriptions to technical artifacts and function ascriptions to art works and their instances. In the second part, an account that meets these desiderata is developed.

What the Mona Lisa and a Screwdriver Have in Common

Bahr

2019

The Interactions of Function and Aesthetic Value in Artifacts

Stecker

2019

In this paper, I ask: what is the role of function in appreciating artifacts? I will argue that several distinguishable functions are relevant to the aesthetic appreciation of artifacts, and sometimes more than one of these must be taken into account to adequately appreciate these objects. Second, I will claim that, while we can identify something we might call functional aesthetic value or functional beauty, the aesthetic properties that contribute to this value neither need to enhance the object’s performance of its primary function nor manifest that function. There are broader criteria for what properties are relevant to functional beauty. Finally, I suggest that the aesthetic appreciation of artifacts may contribute to a larger appreciative project: the understanding and evaluation of a way of life, or social or cultural practices in which the artifact plays a role.

Phantom Functions and the Evolutionary Theory of Artefact Proper Function

Parsons

2019

The evolutionary theory of artefact proper function holds that an artefact’s proper function is that effect which explains the reproduction of past instances of the artefact type. This theory has many sources but received its clearest presentation in Beth Preston’s essay “Why Is a Wing Like a Spoon?” (1998). More recently, Preston has raised an objection to the theory, based on the phenomenon of ‘phantom functions’: these are functions that an artefact type is unable to perform, but which nonetheless apparently constitute its proper function. Deflecting qi energy, for example, is the proper function of feng shui mirrors, even though no feng shui mirror is able to do this (since qi does not exist). Preston concludes that the existence of phantom functions refutes the evolutionary theory of artefact proper function. In this paper, the evolutionary theory is defended, by arguing that it can adequately account for phantom function cases.