Artifactualization without Physical Modification

Abstract

Much recent discussion has focused on the nature of artifacts, particularly on whether they have essences. While it's often held that artifacts are intention-dependent and necessarily have functions, it's equally held, though far less discussed, that artifacts are the result of physical modification of some material objects. This paper argues that the physical modification condition on artifacts is false. First, it formulates the physical modification condition perspicuously for the first time. Second, it offers counterexamples to this condition. Third, it considers, and rejects, two responses to these counterexamples, one which appeals to the distinction between being a K and being used as a K and another which argues that the counterexamples are merely of functional, not artifactual, kinds. Finally, it considers, and rejects, a more general objection that appropriation makes artifact creation too easy. Therefore, artifacts can be created by appropriation and it sketches some success conditions for such appropriation. something to serve some function doesn't seem sufficient for successfully making an artifact. Imagine I intend to make a bowl to serve salad. If I don't do anything to execute my intention to make something to serve salad, then I won't succeed in making a bowl. As a result, intention-dependence and function seem necessary, but not sufficient, to make an artifact. What further condition could be added to yield jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for being an artifact?A further plausible pre-theoretical condition on being an artifact is that they must result from the physical modification of some material things or stuff. To make a salad bowl or a chair, an agent does something -she shapes, fires, and glazes some clay or she cuts, sands, nails, and varnishes some wood. This physical modification condition seems to be borne out by our artifact practices. Shirts result from cotton being dyed, shaped, and sewed. A cake is made by mixing a variety of ingredients and subjecting them to heat. Buildings are complex, technical creations constructed out of diverse materials by multiple coordinating agents. Chairs, pencils, cars, key fobs, cellphones, boots -almost everything that surrounds us in our daily lives -appear to be the result of agents intentionally physically modifying some objects in order to serve some function or purpose. While this physical modification condition is pre-theoretic, many philosophers also hold this view. 2 Despite being intuitive and widespread, no one has given a full defense of the view that artifacts must be the result of physical modification, let alone formulated the condition precisely. Moreover, it may seem subject to easy counterexamples. It's therefore important to see why and how it fails. Thus, my aim in this paper is to show that the physical modification condition on artifacts, or PMC for short, is false. As a result, artifacts can be created by appropriation -pre-existing objects can become artifacts without being physically modified. 3 I also aim to accompl...

Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Table

“…From this, I believe that IC combined with CBF allows fictional creationists to provide a satisfactory answer to Brock's When and How question. 36 I have also pointed out two important ramifications of accepting CBF: First, CBF implies that there is room for the concept of appropriating both pre-existing concrete and abstract objects as concrete and abstract artifacts by a rigid communal belief. Second, if CBF is correct, there is an overlooked but important way of bringing artifacts into existence that should merit serious consideration in favor of the mind-dependence (but neither intention-dependence nor mind-independence) view of artifacts.…”

“…19 This is in line with the functionalist view about a table, that table is a functional kind (See, e.g., Mag Uidhir [34] (p. 108), Brock [35], Goodman [33]). 20 Juvshik [36] (pp. 559-560) also provides a similar criticism against the functionalist view.…”

“…For the present purpose, however, I will not discuss this issue further and simply assume that table is an artifact kind. 26 For those who accept appropriation, see, e.g., Baker [37] (p. 53 n.8); Koslicki [38] (p. 231 n.14), Juvshik [36]. For those who reject appropriation, see, e.g., Mag Uidhir [34] (pp.…”

On the social nature of artefacts

“…My point is that in some cases the group's conception of the cluster of K-relevant This draws out the close connection between art and artefacts, generally, and indeed I'm assuming that all artworks are artefacts. For discussion of the denial that all artworks are artefacts, see Weitz (1956), Davies (1991), andJuvshik (2021b), and see Bahr (2019) for the relation between the two.…”

“…Scheele's (2006, 29–30) example of the Pieterskerk being collectively appropriated as a public event hall would be a case where group acceptance of an artefact of one kind creates an artefact of another kind. Finally, Juvshik (2021b) has recently defended artefact creation by appropriation at length and argues that social acceptance of an act of appropriation is often sufficient for that act of appropriation to be successful (Juvshik, 2021b, 563–568). Regardless of whether the maker's initial intention succeeded or failed, group acceptance leads to the maker's attempt being appropriated as a member of a different artefact kind from the one originally intended.…”