Our aim in this paper is to motivate a version of fictionalism about temporal thought. Temporal thoughts are everyday thoughts such as Penny's thought that the baby shower occurred later than her birthday; Barry's thought that it will rain tomorrow; Annie's thought that the future looks grim; Freddie's thought that it took 5 seconds for her to come up with a counterexample; Helen's thought that it is not possible to change the past; and so on. These temporal thoughts seem to make indispensable reference to time. If, however, our world is timeless, then how are we to make sense of such thoughts? We should be clear from the outset that in this paper we assume that there are temporal thoughts even if time does not exist. For this is how our world is: it is full of temporal thoughts. And so, if a timeless theory is true, then we live in a world that is both timeless and full of such thoughts. In short, the assumption that a timeless theory is (or at least could be, for all we know) true requires assuming (at a minimum) that the theory is compatible with conscious experience. Thus, our claim in this paper is a conditional one: if certain physical theories, according to which there is no time, are true, then temporal fictionalism should be a leading view about our temporal