What is temporal ontology?

Deng, Natalja

doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0893-6

Cited by 14 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…This objection is significant, but it is important to notice that it is in fact just another version of the classical "triviality challenge" against Presentism in general, which argues that it is impossible to formulate the debate between Presentism and the Block Theory in a way that doesn't make the central presentist claim either trivially true or trivially false (see Deasy, 2019;Deng, 2018;Meyer, 2005;Mozersky, 2011, pp. 122-125;Sider, 1999, pp.…”

Section: The Tu Quoque Objection: the Presentist Cerberusmentioning

confidence: 99%

If presentism is false, then I don’t exist. On common-sense presentism

Guillon

2024

Synthese

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For many presentist philosophers, e.g. Zimmerman (Contemp Debates Metaphys 10:211–225, 2008), a central motivation in favour of presentism is that it is supposed to be part of common sense. But the fact that common-sense intuitions are indeed presentist is usually taken for granted (and sometimes also conceded by eternalists). As has been shown in other domains of philosophy (e.g. free will), we should be careful when attributing some supposed intuitions to common sense, and Torrengo (Phenomenology and Mind 12: 50–55, 2017) and Le Bihan (Igitur-Arguments Philos 9(1):1–23, 2018) have legitimately raised doubts about the assumption that common sense is presentist. In this paper, I take up this challenge and try to show that our common-sense intuitions do imply presentism. More precisely, the intuitions that I take to imply presentism are fundamental intuitions about our selves as conscious beings. The upshot is that presentism is so much embedded within our conception of our selves that if presentism is false, then I don’t exist!

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Section: The Tu Quoque Objection: the Presentist Cerberusmentioning

confidence: 99%

If presentism is false, then I don’t exist. On common-sense presentism

Guillon

2024

Synthese

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“…The triviality challenge teaches us not to saddle either side in temporal ontology with a denial of these claims. And it leaves us at a loss for how else to construe the positions (Savitt 2006, Deng 2018). This assessment is Carnapian in spirit, in the sense that Carnap would even maintain that the question of temporal ontology, like other ontological questions, is meaningless.…”

Section: Carnap Triviality and Temporal Passagementioning

confidence: 99%

What Quine (and Carnap) Might Say about Contemporary Metaphysics of Time

Deng¹

2020

Quine, Structure, and Ontology

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This chapter explores the relations between Quine’s and Carnap’s metaontological stances on the one hand, and contemporary work in the metaphysics of time on the other. Contemporary metaphysics of time, like analytic metaphysics in general, grew out of the revival of the discipline that Quine’s critique of the logical empiricists made possible. At the same time, the metaphysics of time has in some respects strayed far from its Quinean roots. This chapter examines some likely Quinean and Carnapian reactions to elements of the contemporary scene. The main claim is that contemporary temporal metaphysics is characterized by a degree of metaphysical seriousness that goes beyond anything found in either Carnap or Quine. The chapter also suggests that there are affinities between Carnapian approaches to temporal ontology and deflationary attitudes towards the question of whether time passes.

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“…Deng (2018) links the temporal and normative cases together quite closely. The account of temporal ontology that Deng offers may provide the resources needed to develop a version of non-cognitivism.13 Since, arguably, the most well accepted and sophisticated versions of moral non-cognitivism on the market are variants of…”

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confidence: 91%

Temporal Fictionalism for a Timeless World

Baron

Miller

Tallant

2019

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Our aim in this paper is to motivate a version of fictionalism about temporal thought. Temporal thoughts are everyday thoughts such as Penny's thought that the baby shower occurred later than her birthday; Barry's thought that it will rain tomorrow; Annie's thought that the future looks grim; Freddie's thought that it took 5 seconds for her to come up with a counterexample; Helen's thought that it is not possible to change the past; and so on. These temporal thoughts seem to make indispensable reference to time. If, however, our world is timeless, then how are we to make sense of such thoughts? We should be clear from the outset that in this paper we assume that there are temporal thoughts even if time does not exist. For this is how our world is: it is full of temporal thoughts. And so, if a timeless theory is true, then we live in a world that is both timeless and full of such thoughts. In short, the assumption that a timeless theory is (or at least could be, for all we know) true requires assuming (at a minimum) that the theory is compatible with conscious experience. Thus, our claim in this paper is a conditional one: if certain physical theories, according to which there is no time, are true, then temporal fictionalism should be a leading view about our temporal

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What is temporal ontology?

Cited by 14 publications

References 11 publications

If presentism is false, then I don’t exist. On common-sense presentism

If presentism is false, then I don’t exist. On common-sense presentism

What Quine (and Carnap) Might Say about Contemporary Metaphysics of Time

Temporal Fictionalism for a Timeless World

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