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Here, I defend the view that there is no sensible way to pin a truth-maker objection on presentism. First, I suggest that if we adopt truth-maker maximalism then the presentist can requisition appropriate ontological resources with impunity. Second, if we deny maximalism, then the presentist can sensibly restrict the truthmaker principle in order to avoid the demand for truth-makers for talk about the non-present.

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Keywords: presentism; truth-making; the truth-maker objection to presentism. 1.It is a period of civil war (for presentists)Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, 1 face a familiar problem concerning truths about the past. 2 It seems presentists believe each of the following: (i) presentism; (ii) truth-maker theory (truths about the past are 'made true' by some element of our ontology); and, (iii) there are (evidence-transcendent and objective) truths about the past. 3 For obvious reasons, presentists will not be inclined to give up on presentism. The claim that truths about the past are 'made true' by some element of our ontology is popular and well-defended. 4 And, so long as they wish to avoid flying in the face of common sense, presentists must agree that there are truths about the past, e.g. that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. (We metaphysicians defer to historians on this matter.) Hence, is true, 5 and so must have a truth-maker. But note: Caesar is not a present object. And so, it seems, there is a tension.Presentists should-but cannot-locate truth-makers for true propositions about the past.