What does the ‘militariat’ do when it rules? military regimes: the Gambia, Sierra Leone and Liberia

Abstract

A significant group of military interventions, especially in West Africa, has been carried out not by disaffected senior officers, but by junior officers and NCOs ‐ the militariat, occupying a class position within the army analogous to the working class within society as a whole. Such interventions are directed as much against the senior officers as against the political elite to which they are closely linked by clientelist ties. Despite this, and the populist rhetoric adopted by the militariat when first in power, the regimes they install have failed to adopt social transformative goals, or create new mobilisational political structures. Comparison of Liberia under the PRC (1980–89), Sierra Leone under the NPRC (1992–96) and the Gambia under the AFPRC (1994) shows that instead the regimes are marked by violence and instability, and in two cases by the outbreak of civil war. Corruption and human rights abuses have been commonplace, and the regimes have failed to strengthen state capacities, to restore military discipline, or to create new social and political institutions. This underpins their reluctance to relinquish power voluntarily. These characteristics are attributed to the lumpen culture of the militariat, to its subversion of military discipline, and to the decay of political and social institutions under the precursor regimes. As the Gambia suffered to a lesser degree from all three of these, it shares the features of the militariat to a lesser degree than Liberia or Sierra Leone.

Transition without Rupture: Sierra Leone's Transfer Election of 1996

“…What emerges from this review of Sierra Leone's transfer election a n d its aftermath is the recognition that the c o m m i t m e n t of Sierra Leone's political elite to democratic change lags b e h i n d the democratic aspirations of popular sectors. Democracy, however, cannot be sustained by mass pressures alone or in the absence of procedural consensus a m o n g elites (Kandeh 1995). Civil society was instrumental in e n d i n g military rule in 1996 and resisting its return in 1997, b u t how m u c h longer it can continue to resist military usurpations is uncertain.…”

“…Ending the rebel war and rescuing the state from further disintegration were prioritized over democratization. While most Sierra Leoneans initially welcomed the NPRC as a redemptive force, the Junta's inability to end the rebel war and restore state capacity rekindled popular demands for democratic elections (Fyle 1994, Kandeh 1996. This popular domestic resurgence was reinforced by the international community, for whom a post-Cold War global reality offered fresh opportunities to promote democracy.…”

The Challenge of Stability and Security in West Africa

“…It also precipitated a number of subaltern military coups. Such coups took place in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Liberia, and Mali (Kandeh 1996(Kandeh , 2004a; Sierra Leone experienced three of them (in 1968, 1992, and 1997) (for a discussion of and statistics on coups, see chapter 5).…”

Rethinking burgeoning political consciousness: student activists, the Class of ‘99 and political intent in Sierra Leone

“…Most analyses of the first coup to occur during the 1990s, the NPRC in 1992, attribute it solely to a small cadre of young army officers, disgruntled about their lack of pay, provisions and terms of service, who left the war's eastern front and drove to Freetown and took over the government in a bloodless coup as President Momoh and his cabinet fled to Guinea (Bangura 2000: 554; Gberie 2005: 68; Kandeh 1996: 390; Peters 2006: 47; Peters & Richards 1998: 184; Richards 1996: 9; Zack-Williams & Riley 1993). Only a few mention the relationship between students and coup leaders.…”