1998
DOI: 10.2307/524828
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Transition without Rupture: Sierra Leone's Transfer Election of 1996

Abstract: : Sierra Leone's transfer election of 1996 was instigated by a resurgent civil society that came alive after thirty years of dictatorship. This electoral democratic renewal did not, however, alter the spoils logic that has defined the organization and exercise of political power in Sierra Leone since the late 1960s. Because performance by a popularly elected government is critical to the consolidation of public support for democracy, the SLPP's inability to distance itself from its discredited precursors endan… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
6
0
1

Year Published

2003
2003
2022
2022

Publication Types

Select...
4
3
2

Relationship

2
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 13 publications
(7 citation statements)
references
References 15 publications
0
6
0
1
Order By: Relevance
“…The democratic reforms initiated during the Betancur government (1982–1986) entailed the opening of the political space for previously excluded groups; the formation of new political parties, including those set up by former guerrillas; the expansion of local elections (Pardo, 2002); amnesty for political prisoners; and “dialogue among all key political actors (including representatives of the nation's guerrilla movements) and the establishment of ground rules for participation and democratic opposition” (Chernick, 1988: 53–54). Most strikingly, the Betancur government acknowledged past errors of the Colombian state and recognized that the lack of opportunities for political participation, poverty, inequality and injustice created an environment within which insurgents groups emerged and challenged the state (Kline, 1999; Pardo, 2002). As put by Pardo (2002: 3–4), “the Betancur government's search for peace could thus be seen as a kind of act of contrition by an establishment that recognized its errors, partially embraced the guerrillas’ concerns, and clearly demonstrated its willingness to make amends”.…”
Section: Democratization and The Willingness To Negotiatementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The democratic reforms initiated during the Betancur government (1982–1986) entailed the opening of the political space for previously excluded groups; the formation of new political parties, including those set up by former guerrillas; the expansion of local elections (Pardo, 2002); amnesty for political prisoners; and “dialogue among all key political actors (including representatives of the nation's guerrilla movements) and the establishment of ground rules for participation and democratic opposition” (Chernick, 1988: 53–54). Most strikingly, the Betancur government acknowledged past errors of the Colombian state and recognized that the lack of opportunities for political participation, poverty, inequality and injustice created an environment within which insurgents groups emerged and challenged the state (Kline, 1999; Pardo, 2002). As put by Pardo (2002: 3–4), “the Betancur government's search for peace could thus be seen as a kind of act of contrition by an establishment that recognized its errors, partially embraced the guerrillas’ concerns, and clearly demonstrated its willingness to make amends”.…”
Section: Democratization and The Willingness To Negotiatementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The APC also recruited marginalized (mostly urban) youth as professional thugs. Kandeh (1998), for instance, has noted how political elites before the war had taken advantage (and fostered the growth) of a class of urban "lumpen youth" as a cheap source of coercive power : "APC violence and thuggery relied almost exclusively on the recruitment of urban thugs and rural drifters. As Ismail Rashid (1997) points out, most of the thugs recruited by APC patrons in the 1960s and 70s came from peri-urban enclaves like Sawpit, Magazine and Kannikay -all in Freetown" (p. 359).…”
Section: Indirect Rule and State Weaknessmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Equally, the final results suffered from revelations of over-voting -where there are greater than 100% turnouts -particularly in the south and east where the new SLPP government and president, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, drew much of their support. The 70% landslide for the Kabbah government in 2002 emerged when the party took rather undeserved credit for the culmination of the war, but the problems of over-voting and violence continued and the considerable advantages of incumbency were evident (Harris 2011, 94-103;Kandeh 1998).…”
Section: A Short History Of Elections In Sierra Leonementioning
confidence: 99%