What can other animals tell us about human social cognition? An evolutionary perspective on reflective and reflexive processing

Abstract

Human neuroscience has seen a recent boom in studies on reflective, controlled, explicit social cognitive functions like imitation, perspective-taking, and empathy. The relationship of these higher-level functions to lower-level, reflexive, automatic, implicit functions is an area of current research. As the field continues to address this relationship, we suggest that an evolutionary, comparative approach will be useful, even essential. There is a large body of research on reflexive, automatic, implicit processes in animals. A growing perspective sees social cognitive processes as phylogenically continuous, making findings in other species relevant for understanding our own. One of these phylogenically continuous processes appears to be self-other matching or simulation. Mice are more sensitive to pain after watching other mice experience pain; geese experience heart rate increases when seeing their mate in conflict; and infant macaques, chimpanzees, and humans automatically mimic adult facial expressions. In this article, we review findings in different species that illustrate how such reflexive processes are related to (“higher order”) reflexive processes, such as cognitive empathy, theory of mind, and learning by imitation. We do so in the context of self-other matching in three different domains—in the motor domain (somatomotor movements), in the perceptual domain (eye movements and cognition about visual perception), and in the autonomic/emotional domain. We also review research on the developmental origin of these processes and their neural bases across species. We highlight gaps in existing knowledge and point out some questions for future research. We conclude that our understanding of the psychological and neural mechanisms of self-other mapping and other functions in our own species can be informed by considering the layered complexity these functions in other species.

Visual attention during neonatal imitation in newborn macaque monkeys

“…Longitudinal (Suddendorf, Oostenbroek, Nielsen, & Slaughter, 2012) and comparative (de Waal & Ferrari, 2010) studies would be particularly insightful for determining the causes of individual differences in neonatal imitation. A bottom-up approach to social cognition within a comparative perspective (de Waal & Ferrari, 2010) will provide unique insights into the development of early socioemotional exchanges, behaviors that are likely phylogenetically continuous (Hecht, Patterson, & Barbey, 2012). Though differences in visual attention cannot account for all individual differences in imitative abilities, visual attention during social interactions is critically important for ensuring that communicative exchanges are accurately conveyed and received.…”

Affiliation, empathy, and the origins of theory of mind

“…Any attempt to determine whether an animal does or does not understand what another individual knows or thinks is inevitably confounded by the fact that the reflective processes associated with higher levels of ToM are closely linked to-and often hard to distinguish from-the more automatic, reflexive processes that underlie them (8,9). Although we are consciously aware of the distinction between our own and others' mental states, we are often unaware of the many cues on which this awareness is based.…”

“…Reflective, explicit empathy involves the ability to recognize emotional states like grief or fear in others without necessarily experiencing the same emotions oneself (8). However, reflective empathy evokes activity not just in the cortex but also more primitive areas of the brain shared with many animals, including the midbrain, the brainstem, and endocrine systems associated with reactivity, reward, and social attachment (14,15).…”

Evaluating Behavior in Mouse Models of the Behavioral Variant of Frontotemporal Dementia: Which Test for Which Symptom?

“…Indeed the prefrontal cortex is much less developed in mice than in humans. Furthermore, in animals, the theory of mind has so far only been proven in apes [51]. However, we know that mice can detect pain and fear in their fellow mice, which influences their own feelings and behavior.…”