Affiliation, empathy, and the origins of theory of mind

Abstract

To understand the evolution of a Theory of Mind, we need to understand the selective factors that might have jumpstarted its initial evolution. We argue that a subconscious, reflexive appreciation of others' intentions, emotions, and perspectives is at the roots of even the most complex forms of Theory of Mind and that these abilities may have evolved because natural selection has favored individuals that are motivated to empathize with others and attend to their social interactions. These skills are adaptive because they are essential to forming strong, enduring social bonds, which in turn enhance reproductive success. We first review evidence from both humans and other animals indicating that reflexive and reflective mental state attributions are inextricably linked and play a crucial role in promoting affiliative social bonds. We next describe results from free-ranging female baboons showing that individuals who show high rates of affiliative behavior form stronger social bonds with other females. These bonds, in turn, are linked to fitness. We then provide data from three different types of social challenges (male immigration, changes in grooming behavior after the death of a close relative, and responses during playback experiments), suggesting that females who manifest high rates of affiliative behavior may also be more motivated to anticipate challenges, react adaptively to setbacks, and respond appropriately to social interactions. There is considerable evidence that many animals are reflexively attuned to other individuals' gaze, intentions, and emotions; however, the degree to which they are also reflectively aware of others' knowledge and beliefs is less clear (3). Problems in assessment arise in part because whenever an animal behaves in ways that suggest an understanding of another's knowledge, its behavior can often also be explained by simpler mechanisms, including learned contingences. A chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) who takes food that a rival cannot see might do so because she understands the relation between seeing and knowing or because she has learned the behavioral rule that a rival is motivated to defend food at which he is looking. Although experiments have attempted to distinguish between these explanations (4-7), results have not been easy to interpret. At the very least, they suggest that animals' understanding of others' psychological states is quite different and perhaps less subject to conscious reflection than adult humans'. Whatever the explanation, it is clear that attempting to identify precise, definitive benchmarks of mental state attribution in animals has proved to be more elusive and less productive than first hoped.Here, we take a slightly different approach to the question of mental state attribution in animals and consider the selective factors that might have favored the evolution of a rudimentary ToM. We begin by assuming that a full-blown ToM evolved from more rudimentary, reflexive forms that were themselves adaptive in their own right. As a first step in understandin...

Adaptations for social cognition in the primate brain

“…These females also seem to be more motivated to anticipate challenges and to react adaptively to setbacks. They show a greater anticipatory increase in fGC levels upon the immigration of a potentially infanticidal male and a greater increase in grooming partners following the death of a close relative [11]. In contrast, females who are less friendly and who are often alone form significantly weaker bonds.…”

Coming to terms with fear

“…However, much research in psychology and neuroscience shows that people exercise less conscious control of their behavior than they believe (103)(104)(105)(123)(124)(125). Careful analyses show that implicit processes often underlie (126), and in some cases account for (127), presumed mental states in animals. Conscious mental states should not, in the absence of direct evidence, be the first choice explanation of behavior, even in humans.…”

Transforming (perceived) rigidity in environmental law through adaptive governance: a case of Endangered Species Act implementation

“…Although the adaptive governance literature highlights the important role of social capital, including trust, collaboration, participatory capacity, leadership, social networks, and social learning (Folke et al 2005), it focuses on the societal or group level of this phenomenon. It generally ignores the psychology of emotions, cognitive framing, empathy, and reconciliation in the creation and maintenance of social capital, which in turn supports society's adaptive capacity (e.g., Seyfarth andCheney 2013, Arnold 2014). For example, strong leadership is central to the development of social capital and the adaptive capacity of governance systems, but the emotional aspects of leadership strategies have not been adequately acknowledged in the adaptive governance literature Westley 2011, Evans et al 2015).…”