Welfare Reform, Mississippi Style: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and the Search for Accountability

Abstract

Through an examination of the implementation of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act in the state of Mississippi, we explore the adequacy of traditional two-actor principal-agent theory. Using this as our lens, we suggest that the choices made by Mississippi in the area of welfare reform to privatize much of the work and to add several layers to the existing principal-agent relationship substantially reduced accountability and the effectiveness of the monitoring systems. We conclude that not only is traditional principal-agent theory an insufficient tool for understanding the complex interrelationship between democratic actors in this particular case, the decisions of the state of Mississippi to complicate the principal-actor relationship through privatization also undermined the reform effort itself in ways that may have general implications for other like-minded efforts in other policy areas.There are those who are undermining what we are trying to achieve … -Bud Henry,

Redesigning Welfare Services for Policies Effectiveness: The non-profit organizations (NPOs) perspective

“…Participatory governance models are also the topic of a wide literature on New Public Management, privatization, contracting-out and public/private partnerships, focusing on the instruments of governance, government, accountability and monitoring of the private actors involved in supplying public services (Blasi, 2002;Breaux et al, 2002;Van Slyke, 2002). The development of these contributions was followed by a debate on the appropriateness of the managerial model for supplying public services and its effects (Kickert et al, 1997;Metcalfe and Richards, 1991;Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004).…”

Privatizing the Welfare State: Nonprofit Community-Based Organizations as Political Actors

“…In the United States, NPOs currently deliver the majority of state-funded direct services to citizens (Hodgkinson and Weitzman 1986;Katz 1996;Salamon 1995;Smith and Lipsky 1993). However, direct services can vary greatly in their quality and effectiveness, depending on the skills and practices of the service providers (e.g., Breaux et al 2002;Chaskin 2001;Fabricant and Fisher 2002;Meyers, Riccucci, and Lurie 2001;Smith and Lipsky 1993;Stein 1990). 5 Direct services, on the other hand, are supported by discretionary government spending, which is subject to regular appropriations by Congress and state and local legislatures (Posner and Wrightson 1996;Weaver 1985).…”

Are We Really on the Same Page? An Empirical Examination of Value Congruence Between Public Sector and Nonprofit Sector Managers

“…As public resources become more scarce and demands for goods and services increase, governments search for ways to meet these demands. The privatization movement has touted the market efficiencies of capitalism as the best solution for the delivery of traditional public goods and services (Savas 1987(Savas , 2000, but the literature (and reports from practitioners) are rife with examples of value and incentive conflicts that make these partnerships between public and private sector actors problematic (see Breaux et al 2002;Kettl 1988;Sclar 2000). Moreover, Heilman and Johnson (1992, p. 190) point to the inherent tension present in public-private partnerships:…”