Weakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought

Abstract

Sources and Literature Index life in the thirteenth century, it became possible to compare Aristotle's insights with the Augustinian and Christian views of human action. Aristotle prevailed in this comparison to an astonishing extent, but there were also Augustinian and Franciscan critics who did not adopt the Aristotelian view of human action. In addition, new views of action theory emerged in fourteenth-century scholasticism. Although these nominally followed Aristotle and, in some cases, Augustine, they introduced new ways of understanding human action. The discussion of akrasia provided a conceptual laboratory in which new ideas could be tested and their implications spelled out. 5 The richness of medieval philosophy has been discussed in many specialized studies. The results of this discussion have found their way into the more general historical presentations of akrasia. 6 This interest has not, however, extended to the early modern period. The standard work on philosophical terminology, Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, claims, immediately after its elaborate discussion of the medieval period, that 'weakness of will has not been a relevant concept or problem for the philosophy of the modern era. It only begins to be discussed again in the analytic philosophy'. 7 Given that many recent studies deal with akrasia in the writings of Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, and even Kant, this is a suprising statement. 8 It may, however, contain a grain of truth. In order to find a discussion on 'weakness of will' in these philosophers, the interpreter must define akrasia in broad terms; for instance, as general irrationality in human behaviour. One may doubt whether the non-Aristotelian philosophers of the modern era really are discussing Aristotle's problem. As their conceptual framework appears to be a different one, they may not be discussing akrasia but other problems of irrationality in human action. When Justin Gosling writes that 'between the Middle Ages and the twentieth century… interest in these problems [of akrasia] vanishes', 9 he means that Aristotle's questions no longer appeared as genuine philosophical problems after the decline of medieval Aristotelianism.My earlier study investigated Augustine's treatment of the so-called 'reluctant actions' (invitus facere) in addition to Aristotle's discussion. While that study focused on the medieval commentaries on Aristotle's EN, it also paid attention to the reception history of Augustine's views, claiming that his discussion deals with similar, although not identical, problems of 'weakness of will'. The present study follows the same

“My Own Worst Enemy”: Translating <i>Hamartia</i> in Sixteenth-Century Italy

“…70 Moreover, as Saarinen notes, Melancthon's interpretation of akrasia in the third edition of the Loci communes (1544-59) was strongly theological, positing a mental conflict whereby an individual may have had the light of reason, but felt their will torn between the powers of God and those of demons. 71 Both Camerarius's and Melancthon's complete works were placed on the index in 1559 and again in 1564, and thus were unavailable-at least through official channels-in the Italian peninsula. 72 If Castelvetro did not have access to these texts through reformist circles in Italy, he would easily have been able to access them while developing his commentary in Geneva, Lyon, and Vienna between 1564 and 1570.…”

Scotus’s Analysis of the Structure of the Will in the Light of 14th-Century Philosophical and Theological Discussions

“…Medieval philosophical debates on free will address a wide range of specific issues. Contemporary research on these debates focuses on the relationship of the will to the intellect (Hoffmann 2010;Hoffmann, Michon 2017;Ingham 2002;Kiełbasa 2017), the problem of neglect (Barnwell 2010), the issue of akrasia (Hoffmann 2004;Hoffmann, Müller, Perkams 2006;Holopainen 2006;Saarinen 1994;Saarinen 2011) and volitional virtues (Kent 1995), among other issues. One of the most complex problems concerns the structure of acts of free will, which was considered in the context of both philosophical [2] and theological issues.…”

IMAGO DEI AND HUMAN RATIONALITY

“…Naturally, culpability results from the fact that reasoning is, as already observed, conscious action and therefore in relation to our conscience . Saarinen (, 29–30): “This [akratic] choice is not, however, ‘deliberate’ ( ex electione ). In keeping with this idea of consent, the akratic person does not act ‘from ignorance’ ( propter ignorantiam ), although he acts ‘in ignorance’ ( ignorans ) of the particular premise.…”