There is a pervasive trend in Western theology to identify imago Dei with human intellectual and cognitive capacities. However, several contemporary theologians have criticized this view because, according to the critics, it leads to a truncated view of humanity. In this article, I shall concentrate on the question of rationality, first, through theologies of Thomas Aquinas and contemporary Lutheran Robert Jenson, and second, in some branches of recent cognitive psychology. I will argue that there is a significant overlap between contemporary scientific interpretations of rationality and both a traditional Thomistic view and a contemporary ecumenical interpretation of imago Dei. Consequently, it is possible to give an account of imago Dei which takes structural features as central and which is in accord with contemporary science, without falling prey to the dangers that the critics of structuralism point out.In contemporary theological anthropology, theorizing about imago Dei is classified within three distinct groups: structural imago Dei, functional imago Dei, and relational imago Dei. Structural theories try to identify imago Dei with a particular cognitive faculty. Functional theories see imago Dei as a role: humans are representatives, or stewards, of the divine within the created order. Relational theories stress the fundamentally relational and communal nature of human existence, and, ultimately, understand humans as objects of God's address (Cortez 2010, 14-40).
Abstract:The last two decades have seen the (re)emergence of the concept of recognition in ethical and political theory. Oftentimes, recognition is seen as a deeper, more developed version of tolerance, without the problems that tolerance purportedly has. We should not "merely" tolerate different individuals, identities and cultures, but recognize them, or so the argument goes. This move from tolerance to recognition is not without its critics. We will outline some of these criticisms and address them with the resources provided by the theory of recognition. We will suggest that while some of the criticisms are unfounded, the move from tolerance to recognition has a number of problems that the critics have correctly pointed out. The relationship between tolerance and recognition is complex: both have their own aims and functions. We will suggest that there are cases-especially ones that involve deep moral disagreements-where tolerance is a more reasonable aim than recognition.Keywords: tolerance, recognition, oppression, minorities, moral judgment, Charles Taylor, Axel Honneth Traditionally, disagreements and frictions between various dissenting voices and cultural groups have been addressed by invoking the concept of tolerance. Tolerance is supposed give our political theories sufficient resources to deal with cultural and practical differences between various groups without violence or oppression. Despite the popular and academic interest in tolerance in its various forms, many authors have argued that for this task the notion of recognition is better suited than tolerance. Indeed, many insist that because tolerance involves a negative moral judgment, it is inherently insulting, oppressive or otherwise harmful. These authors suggest that we should replace tolerance with attitudes of recognition, as the latter do not necessarily entail negative judgments but, on the contrary, positive affirmation. So, we would be better off politically and ethically, if we sought to recognize various minorities rather than simply tolerating them.1The last two decades have seen the (re)emergence of the concept of recognition in ethical and political theory. Sparked by the work of Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth (both drawing from Hegel) and developed by others, this strand of political theory seeks to provide an overarching account of social justice and explain the way in which Western politics has changed after the Second World War. Roughly speaking, we have seen a shift from the politics of universal rights to the politics of specific identities or cultural minorities. The needs and claims of various cultural, racial and sexual minorities have taken the center stage. The theory of recognition is an attempt to formulate a political theory that takes into account this central development.2 1 Various theories of tolerance and recognition are employed to engage issues in theology, religion, politics and ethics. These include, among others, interreligious dialogue, ecumenism, religious and ideological tolerance and so on. In this p...
SummaryIn this article, we provide a classification of contemporary atheism based on the kinds of worldviews and beliefs atheists hold. We suggest that at least four general types of atheism can be distinguished: scientistic atheism, philosophical atheism, tragic atheism and humanistic atheism, which can then be divided to various subclasses. With this classification, we aim to challenge the view that atheism is not a belief system but merely the lack of belief in some transcendent being. Moreover, there seems to be no single atheism
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