Water Conservation Policy Analysis: An Interregional, Multi‐Output, Primal‐Dual Optimization Approach

Schaible, Glenn D.

doi:10.2307/1243951

Cited by 43 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 25 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…As mentioned above, previous papers have generally used programming models [Bontemps and Couture, 2002;Hooker and Alexander, 1998;Schaible, 1997]. Econometric estimates by Kanazawa [1992] use a much greater level of aggregation.…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Price elasticity reconsidered: Panel estimation of an agricultural water demand function

Schoengold

Sunding

Moreno

2006

Water Resources Research

121

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

[1] Using panel data from a period of water rate reform, this paper estimates the price elasticity of irrigation water demand. Price elasticity is decomposed into the direct effect of water management and the indirect effect of water price on choice of output and irrigation technology. The model is estimated using an instrumental variables strategy to account for the endogeneity of technology and output choices in the water demand equation. Estimation results indicate that the price elasticity of agricultural water demand is À0.79, which is greater than that found in previous studies.

show abstract

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Price elasticity reconsidered: Panel estimation of an agricultural water demand function

Schoengold

Sunding

Moreno

2006

Water Resources Research

121

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Moore et al, 1994;Schaible, 1997;Iglesias et al, 2003). Naturally, irrigated agriculture has been the focus of much of this analysis due to the common perception of this sector as both 'originator and victim' of drought (Grigg, 1996, Iglesias et al, 2003.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, the price elasticity of demand for irrigation water (e.g., Nieswiadomy, 1988); the effect of water price on irrigation development and irrigation technology choice, (e.g., Koundouri et al, 2005); the effect of water restrictions and pricing on crop-choice, land allocation, and crop specific water demand (e.g., Moore et al, 1994, Moore andNegri, 1992). More recently, Schaible (1997) analysed farmers' responses to water conservation policies where groundwater is available as a substitute, while Keplinger et al (1998) focus on quantitative restrictions on groundwater use. Furthermore, using a dynamic simulation, Iglesias et al (2003) show that prudent surface water allocations during non-drought years can limit the negative impacts of water quantity restrictions upon farmers during periods of drought.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The story of the moment: risk averse cypriot farmers respond to drought management

Groom

Koundouri

Nauges³

et al. 2008

Applied Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article illustrates the importance of estimating risk preferences when evaluating water policy. Using agricultural production data from the Kiti region of Cyprus we estimate farmers' risk preferences a la Antle (Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 1, 192-201, 1983, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 69, 509-22, 1987) and show sensitivity to higher order moments of profit, such as skewness. We show that farmers in the Kiti region are risk averse with risk premiums in the region of 20% of expected profit. We use these estimates to analyse the impact of a water quota from the perspective of three policy-makers who differ only in their understanding of farmers' risk preferences. We show in the case of Kiti that policy-makers who model risk preferences incorrectly, that is, either; (a) assume risk neutrality or; (b) ignore down-side risk, wrongly predict the magnitude and direction of input responses and therefore the magnitude of welfare changes. This highlights the importance of accommodating preferences for higher order moments of profit in the evaluation of water policy.

show abstract

“…The main assumption underlying the regulator's ability to achieve one or more of the above policy objectives by way of tariffs relies on direct or indirect knowledge of the amount of water used by individual sectors or agents. Hence, water metering is a key step in allowing local authorities to develop pricing policies that adhere to EU WFD principles [3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11]. However, the most common pricing systems for irrigation water in the world [12] and in Europe [12,13] rely on area-based charges, disconnected from actual use.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing Policies in Managing Water Resources in Agriculture: an Application of Contract Theory to Unmetered Water

Galioto¹,

Raggi²,

Viaggi³

2012

21st Century Watershed Technology: Improving Water Quality and Environment Conference Proceedings, May 27-June 1, 2012, Bari, I

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract:The paper explores how agricultural water pricing could contribute to lowering water demand when uses are unobserved (asymmetric information). The topic of the paper is justified by the fact that most water authorities worldwide do not control water uses at the farm scale. The study draws inspiration from the pricing policies of a Reclamation and Irrigation Board in Northern Italy. It analyses the optimal design of current tariff strategies with respect both to the actual regulator's goals and the cost recovery objective of an ideal regulator driven by European Water Framework Directive principles and having full information. The analysis is based on the logic of a Principal-Agent model implemented as a mathematical non-linear programming model. Given the current pricing structure and assuming zero transaction costs, the results show a relevant increase in net benefits for the ideal scenario with respect to the actual one as water use costs increase. Benefits differences between the two scenarios mark a limit in value below which mechanisms able to solve the existing asymmetries between the principal and the agents are economically desirable. The study concludes by showing that the current regulator's discriminatory strategy (pricing structure) would be better justified with higher levels of cost for water use. However, the existence of non-zero transaction costs related to the control of water uses points to the need for further research in order to analyze incentive mechanisms in the absence of water metering. OPEN ACCESSWater 2013, 5 1503

show abstract

Water Conservation Policy Analysis: An Interregional, Multi‐Output, Primal‐Dual Optimization Approach

Cited by 43 publications

References 25 publications

Price elasticity reconsidered: Panel estimation of an agricultural water demand function

Price elasticity reconsidered: Panel estimation of an agricultural water demand function

The story of the moment: risk averse cypriot farmers respond to drought management

Pricing Policies in Managing Water Resources in Agriculture: an Application of Contract Theory to Unmetered Water

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About