Virtue and Argument: Taking Character Into Account

Abstract

Abstract:In this paper we consider the prospects for an account of good argument that takes the character of the arguer into consideration. We conclude that although there is much to be gained by identifying the virtues of the good arguer and by considering the ways in which these virtues can be developed in ourselves and in others, virtue argumentation theory does not offer a plausible alternative definition of good argument.Résumé: Dans cet article, nous examinons les avantages d'une notion de bon argument qui prend en considération le caractère d'un argumentateur. Nous concluons que bien qu'il y ait beaucoup à gagner à identifier les vertus d'un bon argumentateur et à tenir compte des façons dont ces vertus peuvent être développées en nous-mêmes et chez les autres, la théorie des vertus dans l'argumentation n'offre pas une alternative plausible aux critères de bon argument.

Bogency and Goodacies: On Argument Quality in Virtue Argumentation Theory

“…Let us now get back to the argument by Bowell and Kingsbury (2013). If my reconstruction is correct, BK does not fare particularly well as a criticism of VAT: it is based on a definition of argument quality that virtue theorists reject, and its conclusion needs to worry only one version of VAT, i.e., ambitious moderation, out of three-too bad for Aberdein, but good for the rest of us!…”

“…If we now turn to step 5 of BK, it is worth noting that Bowell and Kingsbury (2013) tend to shift aim across their paper, or at least to leave open multiple interpretations of what exactly that aim is. Sometimes their critique of VAT is framed in terms of failure (e.g., "VAT does not offer a plausible alternative to a more standard agent-neutral account of good argument," p. 23), but more often they spell it out as a charge of incompleteness: e.g., "any agent-centered account that cannot accommodate [a cogency-based characterization of argument quality] will be unable to offer a complete account of good argument" (p. 24).…”

“…At risk of caricaturing a serious dispute, the whole affair reminds me of the following hypothetical dialogue between Dan, a virtue theorist, and Bo, a "cogency buff", that is, a stalwart defender of cogency as the key to argument quality: This is just a cartoon, of course, but it emphasizes a real problem: by insisting on cogency as key in argument evaluation, Bowell and Kingsbury (2013) focused attention on something which holds relatively little interest for the general rationale and purposes of VAT; in turn, by taking up their challenge and dealing with it, it could be said that Aberdein (2014) allowed the debate on VAT to be momentarily derailed towards matters that are, at best, tangential to it. Nor should my present efforts be regarded as being beyond reproach, since what I am doing is to argue that we should not care much whether cogency is analysable in terms of virtues, and this is tantamount to denying that we have to address the worries raised by Bowell and Kingsbury-an attitude that many argumentation theories would not find especially commendable.…”

Introduction: Virtues and Arguments

“…This was a perspective on the field that had been widely, but not entirely ignored (Brockriede 1972;Hample 2007). It also explains the close focus on the ad hominem fallacy, which is conspicuous in many accounts of the relation of the virtues to argumentation theory, as discussed further below (Johnson 2009;Battaly 2010;Jason 2011;Bowell and Kingsbury 2013;Aberdein 2014;Bondy 2015;Leibowitz 2016). More recently, it has been suggested that an undue focus on ad hominem may distract from virtue argumentation theory's strengths-and from some of its other problems (Paglieri 2015).…”

“…In particular, most virtue argumentation theorists recognize open-mindedness as an important virtue (Cohen 2009), thereby building on a substantial body of recent work in virtue epistemology (Riggs 2010;Baehr 2011;Tiberius 2012) and the philosophy of education (Hare 1985(Hare , 2003(Hare , 2009Hare and McLaughlin 1998;Higgins 2009;Siegel 2009). Lastly, the virtue argumentation programme is now sufficiently mature to have produced overviews, whether positive (Cohen 2013b;Aberdein 2014), negative (Bowell and Kingsbury 2013;Bondy 2015), or studiously even-handed (Paglieri 2015).…”