Introduction: Virtues and Arguments

Aberdein, Andrew; Cohen, D.

doi:10.1007/s11245-016-9366-3

Cited by 12 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…Rather than pursue an empirical investigation of populist argumentation, in this chapter I propose to employ a theoretical framework drawn from virtue theories of argument (VTA). VTA bring the apparatus of virtue ethics, virtue epistemology, and virtue jurisprudence to bear on the understanding and appraisal of arguments (for an overview, see Aberdein and Cohen, 2016). In particular, VTA emphasize the role of arguers in the conduct and evaluation of arguments, and lay particular stress on arguers' acquired dispositions of character, otherwise known as intellectual virtues and vices.…”

Section: Populism and Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Populism and the Virtues of Argument

Aberdein

2022

Engaging Populism

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This chapter argues that a virtue-theoretic account of argumentation can enhance our understanding of the phenomenon of populism and offer some lines of response. Virtue theories of argumentation emphasize the role of arguers in the conduct and evaluation of arguments, and lay particular stress on arguers' acquired dispositions of character, otherwise known as intellectual virtues and vices. Several factors to which the rise of populism has been attributed may be understood as arising from vices of argumentation, including arrogance, emulousness, and insouciance. Conversely, virtues of argument such as humility and good listening offer some prospect of a constructive response to populism.

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Section: Populism and Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Populism and the Virtues of Argument

Aberdein

2022

Engaging Populism

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“…Although, as we have seen, virtues have been invoked for some time in theories of argument, an explicit virtue theory of argumentation (VTA) is a more recent innovation (for a brief survey, see Aberdein and Cohen, 2016). One of the difficulties that besets argumentation theory as a whole is that it is massively interdisciplinary: it brings together work from many different disciplines, including logic, epistemology, both cognitive and social psychology, communication, management, rhetoric, decision theory, law, computer science, education, economics, and others.…”

Section: Virtue Theories Of Argumentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intellectual humility and argumentation

Aberdein¹

2020

The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility

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In this chapter I argue that intellectual humility is related to argumentation in several distinct but mutually supporting ways. I begin by drawing connections between humility and two topics of long-standing importance to the evaluation of informal arguments: the ad verecundiam fallacy and the principle of charity. I then explore the more explicit role that humility plays in recent work on critical thinking dispositions, deliberative virtues, and virtue theories of argumentation. Argumentum ad VerecundiamModern textbook treatments of informal fallacies offer "argumentum ad verecundiam" as an alternative name for "appeal to illegitimate authority" (for example, Copi et al., 2007, p. 51). However, "verecundiam" is not Latin for illegitimate authority; it is Latin for modesty, reverence, shame, or, perhaps, humility. Together with argumentum ad hominem and argumentum ad ignorantiam, argumentum ad verecundiam owes its name to John Locke. Locke does not explicitly characterize any of these arguments as fallacies, but he does say that they are "arguments, that men, in their reasonings with others, do ordinarily make use of, to prevail on their assent; or, at least, so to awe them, as to silence their opposition" (Locke, 1836, IV.xvii.19). As Locke explains, the trick to ad verecundiam argumentation, is to allege the opinions of men, whose parts, learning, eminency, power, or some other cause has gained a name, and settled their reputation in the common esteem with some kind of authority.When men are established in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breach of modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and question the authority of men, who are in possession of it. This is apt to be censured as carrying with it too much of pride, when a man does not readily yield to the determination of approved authors, which is wont to be received with respect and submission by others: and it is looked upon as insolence for a man to set up and adhere to his own opinion against the current stream of antiquity, or to put it in the balance against that of some learned doctor, or otherwise approved writer. Whoever backs his tenets with such authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the cause, and is ready to style it "impudence" in any one who shall stand out against them. This I think may be called argumentum ad verecundiam (ibid.). Locke diagnoses the weakness of such argumentation as taking "another man's opinion to be right, because I, out of respect, or any other consideration but that of conviction, will not contradict him" (ibid.). In modern treatments of this argument, as the fallacy of appeal to illegitimate authority, it is implicitly contrasted with a non-fallacious pattern of argument: appeal to legitimate authority, or more commonly, appeal to expert opinion. Hence modern treatments of the

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“…For at least twenty years, various approaches to visual aspects of argumentation have been the focus of a thriving research programme Groarke, 1996, 2007;Kjeldsen, 2015;Groarke et al, 2016). More recently, virtue-based approaches to various aspects of argumentation have become the focus of another thriving research programme (Mohammed and Lewi ński, 2014;Aberdein and Cohen, 2016). However, these two programmes have, so far as I can determine, been pursued independently.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Virtuous Norms for Visual Arguers

Aberdein

2017

Argumentation

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This paper proposes that virtue theories of argumentation and theories of visual argumentation can be of mutual assistance. An argument that adoption of a virtue approach provides a basis for rejecting the normative independence of visual argumentation is presented and its premisses analysed. This entails an independently valuable clarification of the contrasting normative presuppositions of the various virtue theories of argumentation. A range of different kinds of visual argument are examined, and it is argued that they may all be successfully evaluated within a virtue framework, without invoking any novel virtues.

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Introduction: Virtues and Arguments

Cited by 12 publications

References 50 publications

Populism and the Virtues of Argument

Populism and the Virtues of Argument

Intellectual humility and argumentation

Virtuous Norms for Visual Arguers

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