2013
DOI: 10.5465/amr.2010.0193
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Venture Boards: Distinctive Monitoring and Implications for Firm Performance

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Cited by 123 publications
(155 citation statements)
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“…Because of their ownership proximity, shareholders may be informed directly by the managers and are often sufficiently knowledgeable about the firm's business. In family firms (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004;Ward, 2001), as well as entrepreneurial and venture-backed businesses (Garg, 2013;Rosenstein, 1988;Sapienza et al, 1996), strong personal relationships are shown to increase the flow of information, reduce information asymmetry, and enable greater control by shareholders over strategic decisions. …”
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confidence: 99%
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“…Because of their ownership proximity, shareholders may be informed directly by the managers and are often sufficiently knowledgeable about the firm's business. In family firms (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004;Ward, 2001), as well as entrepreneurial and venture-backed businesses (Garg, 2013;Rosenstein, 1988;Sapienza et al, 1996), strong personal relationships are shown to increase the flow of information, reduce information asymmetry, and enable greater control by shareholders over strategic decisions. …”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This may involve the appointment of outside directors to the board. A major board focus will be on assisting with addressing strategic and financial issues (Sapienza et al, 1996) and overseeing strategic decision-making (Garg, 2013;Rosenstein, 1988;Sapienza et al, 1996).Boards involved in transitioning from a new venture to high growth will play a key part in determining the firm's response to greater external complexity. The board's strategy role will be emphasised in this transition where directors can contribute to decisionmaking and provide key expertise to complement management skills (Daily and Dalton, 1993;Garg and Eisenhardt, 2013;Sapienza et al, 1996).…”
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confidence: 99%
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“…For example, the sales performance, which is associated with reward for sales people refers to greater accountability in marketing management (Homburg, Artz, & Wieseke, 2012). From the point of view of business owner, the measures of firm performance is useful to monitor the significant outcomes and behaviors of managements in order to improve performance (Garg, 2013). In addition, market-based measure is also different with accounting measure.…”
Section: Competitive Advantage Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The posible performance measures have been developed with various interest, such as sales performance that indicates reward of sales staffs as well as performance in marketing management (Homburg, Artz, and Wieseke, 2012). On the other hand, the business owners consider firm performance is essential to monitor the outcomes of their organizations in order to gain more profit (Garg, 2013).…”
Section: Social Capital and Competitive Advantagementioning
confidence: 99%