Varieties of Epistemic Injustice 1

Pohlhaus, Gaile

doi:10.4324/9781315212043-2

Cited by 141 publications

(53 citation statements)

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“…This should be accepted even if one does not also grant that the separate ideas, which are the development of community epistemic capacities, can be a benefit for the people who possess them, or that it is a form of epistemic injustice not to support the development of a hermeneutical framework for understanding the crimes committed by the government. Regardless, fully understanding and supporting this right benefits from an understanding of the “open concept” (Pohlhaus ; also relevant Dotson ) of epistemic justice and other tools from social epistemology.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The emerging discourse and policies around a right to know are important and likely to have significant impact on international institutions, states, societies, and individuals. Because this is a right of people and society to know the truth, it has an epistemic justice component, though the epistemic aspects of this right have thus far been underexamined in the literature (For discussion of what is meant by “epistemic justice” in this context, see e.g., Fricker ; Dotson ; Medina ; Pohlhaus ). Given the importance of the discourse, it is worth bringing the resources of social epistemology to bear on what a right to know would truly require.…”

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confidence: 99%

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A Right to Understand Injustice: Epistemology and the “Right to the Truth” in International Human Rights Discourse

Werkheiser¹

2020

The Southern J of Philosophy

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People's “right to truth” or their “right to know” about their government's human rights abuses is a growing consensus in human rights discourses and a fertile area of work in international and humanitarian law. In most discussions of this right to know the truth, it is commonly seen as requiring the state or international institutions to provide access to evidence of the violations. In this paper, I argue that such a right naturally has many epistemic aspects, and the tools of social epistemology can be helpful in elucidating what such a right entails. As a beginning for this project, I draw on those resources to argue that the right to know the truth is only meaningful if it includes a right to understand the abuses, and that such understanding can only come through the development of community epistemic capacities. Given this, I further argue that the state has a duty to support the development of these capacities, and that a critical place for beginning this process is in public schools.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

A Right to Understand Injustice: Epistemology and the “Right to the Truth” in International Human Rights Discourse

Werkheiser¹

2020

The Southern J of Philosophy

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“…In these cases, people who are experiencing epistemic injustice are labelled as unable to bear knowledge and are not given any credibility in knowledge exchanges, being assigned a passive role in this process and therefore having their voices suppressed [58]. People may also experience epistemic injustice when their questions and issues are discredited through practices and institutions that prevent them from pursuing their enquiries [59]. For example, an illiterate person trying to find information about his/her plot of land, is unable to do so because it requires that they complete a written form in English.…”

Section: Justice and Participatory Mappingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Participatory Mapping in a Developing Country Context: Lessons from South Africa

Weyer

Bezerra

Vos

2019

Land

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Digital participatory mapping improves accessibility to spatial information and the way in which knowledge is co-constructed and landscapes co-managed with impoverished communities. However, many unintended consequences for social and epistemic justice may be exacerbated in developing country contexts. Two South African case studies incorporating Direct-to-Digital participatory mapping in marginalized communities to inform land-use decision-making, and the ethical challenges of adopting this method are discussed. Understanding the past and present context of the site and the power dynamics at play is critical to develop trust and manage expectations among research participants. When employing unfamiliar technology, disparate literacy levels and language barriers create challenges for ensuring participants understand the risks of their involvement and recognize their rights. The logistics of using this approach in remote areas with poor infrastructure and deciding how best to leave the participants with the maps they have co-produced in an accessible format present further challenges. Overcoming these can however offer opportunity for redressing past injustices and empowering marginalized communities with a voice in decisions that affect their livelihoods.

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“…I argue that actively implanted collective ignorance is a type of epistemic injustice that is suitable for understanding the phenomenon of genocide denial. In discussing how the collective denial of genocide can be viewed as an actively implanted ignorance, I use Linda Martin Alcoff's essay "Epistemologies of Ignorance" (Alcoff, 2007) together with Gaile Pohlhaus' taxonomy of three types of epistemic injustice (Pohlhaus, 2017). According to my view, genocide denial can be considered as a form of epistemic injustice because the existence of collective denial requires a social and political environment where systematic distribution of ignorance takes place.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Genocide Denial: A Form of Evil or a Type of Epistemic Injustice?

Oranli¹

2018

Eur. j. interdiscip. stud.

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In this paper, I bring together the philosophical scholarship on evil and the literature on “epistemic injustice” in order to assess effective vocabulary to understand the phenomenon of genocide denial. I use the term “denial” to denote the discursive political tactic that makes the evil of genocide invisible. Adi Ophir’s discussion of “two orders of evil” allows us to consider genocide denial as a form of evil. For what Ophir identifies as a second-order evil, another stream of scholarship suggests the term “epistemic injustice.” This latter literature can also be deployed effectively in treating the question of genocide denial, insofar as it provides an interdisciplinary approach rather than a strictly philosophical one. Epistemic injustice scholars focus on different types of unfair treatment in the realm of knowledge-production, and they agree that exclusion, silencing, invisibility and distorted representation are major forms of epistemic injustice. I argue that both scholarships are crucial to draw out conceptual frameworks for understanding the specific case of genocide denial. Furthermore, I think that interdisciplinary approaches informed by the social sciences are essential to map out the real life implications of the injustices that are implemented through denial.

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Varieties of Epistemic Injustice 1

Cited by 141 publications

References 0 publications

A Right to Understand Injustice: Epistemology and the “Right to the Truth” in International Human Rights Discourse

A Right to Understand Injustice: Epistemology and the “Right to the Truth” in International Human Rights Discourse

Participatory Mapping in a Developing Country Context: Lessons from South Africa

Genocide Denial: A Form of Evil or a Type of Epistemic Injustice?

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