Genocide Denial: A Form of Evil or a Type of Epistemic Injustice?

Abstract

In this paper, I bring together the philosophical scholarship on evil and the literature on “epistemic injustice” in order to assess effective vocabulary to understand the phenomenon of genocide denial. I use the term “denial” to denote the discursive political tactic that makes the evil of genocide invisible. Adi Ophir’s discussion of “two orders of evil” allows us to consider genocide denial as a form of evil. For what Ophir identifies as a second-order evil, another stream of scholarship suggests the term “epistemic injustice.” This latter literature can also be deployed effectively in treating the question of genocide denial, insofar as it provides an interdisciplinary approach rather than a strictly philosophical one. Epistemic injustice scholars focus on different types of unfair treatment in the realm of knowledge-production, and they agree that exclusion, silencing, invisibility and distorted representation are major forms of epistemic injustice. I argue that both scholarships are crucial to draw out conceptual frameworks for understanding the specific case of genocide denial. Furthermore, I think that interdisciplinary approaches informed by the social sciences are essential to map out the real life implications of the injustices that are implemented through denial.

Denial of Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery and Responsibility for Epistemic Amends

“…Denials of historical injustice, either state-or individual-led, often involve epistemic injustices. Oranli (2018) shows, for instance, that Armenian genocide denials involve testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice, and unjust distribution of epistemic resources. For instance, genocide denialists attribute deflated credibility to the survivors (and their kin), thereby silencing the survivors and preventing knowledge about the injustice (Oranli 2018, 50).…”

Objectionable Commemorations: Ethical and Political Issues

“…These connections are worth further exploration. They include connections to discussions in epistemic injustice (Pantazatos, 2017), heritage (Matthes, 2016(Matthes, , 2018a(Matthes, , 2023, evaluating the past and the relativism of distance (Archer & Matheson, 2024;Moody-Adams, 2002;Williams, 1985), cultural genocide (Altanian, 2021a(Altanian, , 2021bOranli, 2018;Oranlı, 2021), or political representation (Dovi, 2018), just to name a few. Similarly, it also may benefit from interacting more with other disciplines such as cultural studies, Black studies, education studies, architecture, geography, or urban studies.…”

Archives, Epistemic Injustice and Knowing the Past

“…Similarly, Oranli (2020) argues that the Turkish denial of the Armenian genocide constitutes and produces pervasive and systematic epistemic harms. In an earlier paper, Oranli (2018) demonstrated that the denial of the Armenian genocide involves several forms of epistemic injustice such as testimonial injustice, hermeneutical injustice and the unjust distribution of epistemic resources. In a more recent paper, Oranlı (2020) draws on the work of Fricker (2007), Medina (2013) and Mills (2017) to demonstrate the interrelatedness of individuals who perpetrate genocide denialism, the ideology behind denialism and the institutions supporting genocide denialism.…”