Variations in Regulatory Enforcement Styles

Abstract

This paper examines intra‐ and inter‐agency variations in the enforcement styles of three regulatory inspectorates in Great Britain. It is argued that the accommodative approach typically associated with regulatory enforcement is not a homogeneous and uniform concept, rather it embraces a range of strategies. These are described and a variety of organisational, social and political factors are considered as explanations of the variations which arise.

Attitudes and Ethics: Evaluating Knowledge and Regulatory Constructs in Planning Enforcement Practice

“…Perhaps the answer to this is found by directing attention to the work of Baldwin and Cave (1999) and Hutter (1997Hutter ( , 2008. Baldwin and Cave's (1999) views largely mirror those of Burby et al (1998) concurring that the achievement of compliance with enforcement regulations can occur through discourse, though importantly, they single out two key types of offender readily identifiable in planning situations, namely, the "well-intentioned and ill-informer" and the "ill-intentioned offender".…”

Policing the roads: traffic cops, ‘Boy Racers’ and anti-social behaviour

“…The community response to policing highlighted the constant pressure police faced to appear efficient (Skolnick, 1975). Enforcement practices were sensitive to the organisational resources available to the agency -especially concerning budget and staff numbers (Hutter, 1989). Sustaining the Dispersal Order for a third time in 2005 was not possible due to the extensive resources required to police the area.…”

Transforming the Inspection Blitz: Targeted Campaigns, Enforcement and the Ombudsman

“…When sanctions are used in the compliance model it is perceived as agency failure to sec~re conformity, whereas in the deterrence model, prosecution statistics are often a positive performance indicator. The use of penalties highlights the disparate conceptions of regulatory enforcement between the two models, with the compliance model simply seeking to ensure conformity with regulations, while the deterrence model demands both retribution and conformity (Hutter 1989).…”

“…and preventing future breaches by concentrating on underlying problems in a non-adversarial manner. Enforcement officials generally adopt lengthy, private bargaining processes which may involve incremental adjustments leading to conformity, or even tradeoffs where immediate action on serious breaches results in additional time to rectify other violations (Hutter 1989;Riess 1984 ).…”