Interface theory (Hoffman, Singh & Prakesh, 2015) is the hypothesis that inferential, representational theories of perception entail that fitness, not truth, dictates the evolution of perceptual systems. They show, with simulations, that 'veridical' perceptual mappings (ones that preserve at least some of the structure of the world) are routinely out-competed by 'non-veridical' interfaces (ones that make no attempt to preserve that structure). They therefore take particular aim at the direct perception, ecological approach to perception (Gibson, 1966(Gibson, , 1979Turvey, Shaw Reed & Mace, 1981) and work to show that such a system, even if technically an option, would never be selected for by evolution. This commentary defends the ecological approach from this novel, existential attack by showing that the ecological hypothesis is so different in kind to the inferential, representational view of perception that it simply falls outside the scope of interface theory's critiques; ecological psychology remains a viable scientific endeavour. This analysis will show that, far from being a radical new approach to perception, interface theory is simply a clear and elegant formalisation of mainstream representational psychology, and any implications interface theory may have belong solely to that branch of science.