Interface Theory vs Gibson: An Ontological Defense of the Ecological Approach

Abstract

Interface theory is the hypothesis that inferential, representational theories of perception entail that fitness, not truth, dictates the evolution of perceptual systems. They show, with simulations, that "veridical" perceptual mappings (ones that preserve at least some of the structure of the world) are routinely out-competed by "non-veridical" interfaces (ones that make no attempt to preserve that structure). They therefore take particular aim at the direct perception, ecological approach to perception and work to show that such a system, even if technically an option, would never be selected for by evolution. This paper defends the ecological approach from this novel, existential attack by showing that the ecological hypothesis is so different in kind to the inferential, representational view of perception that it simply falls outside the scope of interface theory's critiques; ecological psychology remains a viable scientific endeavor. This analysis will show that, far from being a radical new approach to perception, interface theory is simply a clear and elegant formalization of mainstream representational psychology, and any implications interface theory may have belong solely to that branch of science.

Flexible Goals Require that Inflexible Perceptual Systems Produce Veridical Representations: Implications for Realism as Revealed by Evolutionary Simulations

“…We will not explore such nuances in the current paper, since such details will not matter for our primary points or computational demonstrations (and since the original ITP work also does not do so). 2 In other recent work, Hoffman and colleagues have also analyzed such evolutionary questions using analytical proofs rather than evolutionary simulations (e.g., Prakash, 2020;Prakash, Fields, Hoffman, Prentner, & Singh, 2020, 2021. But this work still shares the same key assumptions-and problems-as do the computational projects.…”

“…Our goal in the present paper is not to review this entire (large, multidimensional) debate (see also Angelucci, Fano, Ferretti, Macrelli, & Tarozzi, 2021; Feldman, 2015; Fields, 2015; Koenderink, 2015; Martinez, 2019; Mausfeld, 2015; McLaughlin & Green, 2015; O'Connor, 2014; Schlesinger, 2015; Wilson, 2021), however, and we will largely refrain from weighing in on these many previous critiques and subsequent defenses. Instead, we aim to contribute something new to this discussion, by presenting some key considerations concerning our “cognitive architecture” that pose a stark challenge to ITP (and support the intuitive notion of veridical perception)—but that to our knowledge have not previously been considered in past discussions (by either ITP's proponents or detractors).…”