Interface Theory vs Gibson: An Ontological Defence of the Ecological Approach

Abstract

Interface theory (Hoffman, Singh & Prakesh, 2015) is the hypothesis that inferential, representational theories of perception entail that fitness, not truth, dictates the evolution of perceptual systems. They show, with simulations, that 'veridical' perceptual mappings (ones that preserve at least some of the structure of the world) are routinely out-competed by 'non-veridical' interfaces (ones that make no attempt to preserve that structure). They therefore take particular aim at the direct perception, ecological approach to perception (Gibson, 1966(Gibson, , 1979Turvey, Shaw Reed & Mace, 1981) and work to show that such a system, even if technically an option, would never be selected for by evolution. This commentary defends the ecological approach from this novel, existential attack by showing that the ecological hypothesis is so different in kind to the inferential, representational view of perception that it simply falls outside the scope of interface theory's critiques; ecological psychology remains a viable scientific endeavour. This analysis will show that, far from being a radical new approach to perception, interface theory is simply a clear and elegant formalisation of mainstream representational psychology, and any implications interface theory may have belong solely to that branch of science.

Ecological Representations

“…Symbolic representations, for example, allow an arbitrary mapping between the structure of the representation and the thing it is meant to represent. This provides crucial flexibility for universality, but because the mapping is arbitrary there is no guaranteed way for the representation to have any content, let alone the right content (this problem has most recently been laid out in detail in the interface theory of perception; Hoffman, Singh & Prakesh, 2015; see also Wilson, 2018a).…”

“…Barsalou, 1999;Harnad, 1990). Such well-motivated attempts fail, however, due to the lack of an adequate theory of perception (Turvey et al, 1981;Wilson, 2018a) which means that even the lower perceptual representations lack internally defined content. This "infinite regress of interpreters interpreting" (Bickhard, 2009, p 573) is endemic to any representational account where content is defined externally, which Bickhard argues includes all the main types of representation (including the theories of Milikan, Fodor, Dretske, and Cummins).…”

“…These representations are, however, not the computational mental representations of mainstream cognitive psychology, nor could they simply be swapped into such theories. Unlike traditional representations, which must enrich, model or predict sensory data, the psychological power of our decoupled neural activity can only come from its relationship to external ecological information and the property it designates, and that information is given to, rather than invented by, the nervous system (Wilson, 2018a).…”

“…Not everyone thinks the problem remains(Steels, 1997;Taddeo & Floridi, 2007). But the debate remains(Bringsjord, 2015;Wilson, 2018a) and so, for the people who, like us, still worry about this problem, we discuss it here and later, endeavour to solve it.…”

Ecological mechanisms in cognitive science

“…This framework is firmly rooted in James J. Gibson’s ecological approach to perception and action (Gibson, 1979), with the resulting mechanistic models grounded at the scale of Gibsonian perceptual information. Our analysis has emerged from our work pursuing the implications of the ecological ontology for cognitive science in general (Charles, Golonka, & Wilson, 2014; Golonka, 2015; Golonka & Wilson, 2012, 2019; Wilson, 2012, 2014, 2018a, 2018b; Wilson & Golonka, 2013, 2015). It became clear to us that the most appropriate framing to identify what makes the ecological approach distinct was in terms of the types of explanations it made possible.…”