Union Wage Responses to Tax Changes
            
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Hersoug, Tor

doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041626

Cited by 79 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…2 2 There is a large literature (which includes both theoretical and empirical contributions) dealing with wage formation and tax progression; see e.g. Layard (1982), Hersoug (1984), Malcolmson and Sartor (1987), Lockwood and Manning (1993), Holmlund and Kolm (1995), Tyrväinen (1995), Koskela and Vilmunen (1996), Aronsson, Wikström and Brännlund (1997), Hansen (1999) and Lockwood, Sløk and Tranæs (2000). The available empirical evidence seems, to a large extent, to be consistent with the view that higher tax progression moderates wage claims.…”

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confidence: 87%

Is the Optimal Labor Income Tax Progressive in a Unionized Economy?*

Aronsson

Sjögren

2004

Scandinavian J Economics

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This paper concerns optimal nonlinear labor income taxation in an economy with union wage setting and endogenous hours of work. The purpose is to study the determinants of tax progression. We show that the optimal degree of progression of the labor income tax depends on the extent to which the government can influence the wage rate via tax policy as well as on its ability to redistribute income across individuals. In addition, the argument for progressive labor income taxation depends on whether hours of work are chosen by the employed themselves or the union.

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confidence: 87%

Is the Optimal Labor Income Tax Progressive in a Unionized Economy?*

Aronsson

Sjögren

2004

Scandinavian J Economics

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“…The effects of taxation in union bargaining models have been studied carefully byHersoug (1984),Lockwood and Manning (1993) andHolmlund and Kolm (1995), among others, whileHoel (1990) andPisauro (1991) have analysed tax effects in efficiency wage models Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995). andPissarides (1996) illuminate the effects of taxes in different types of search model.…”

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confidence: 99%

Public finance solutions to the European unemployment problem?

Sørenson¹

1997

Economic Policy

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Unemployment in Europe is heavily concentrated among low-skilled workers. It has therefore been suggested that structural unemployment could be reduced by shifting the tax burden away from low-skilled labour and away from the production of consumer services, which are intensive in the use of such labour. This paper finds that a tax shift away from low-paid labour may raise aggregate employment and welfare, but only if wage formation is sufficiently responsive to changing tax incentives. The analysis also suggests that non-negligible employment and welfare gains could be reaped by offering tax concessions or subsidies to those parts of the consumer service sector which compete most directly with low-productivity home production and with underground economic activity. Copyright Centre for Economic Policy Research, Centre for Economic Studies, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme 1997.

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“…Since Hersoug (1984), there has been a growing literature on the effect of tax progressivity on labour market outcomes in imperfect labour markets (for a survey see Røed and Strøm, 2002). These papers share one conclusion in common: Tax progressivity moderates wages.…”

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confidence: 99%

Tax progression and training in a matching framework

Hungerbühler

2007

Labour Economics

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Union Wage Responses to Tax Changes *

Cited by 79 publications

References 9 publications

Is the Optimal Labor Income Tax Progressive in a Unionized Economy?*

Is the Optimal Labor Income Tax Progressive in a Unionized Economy?*

Public finance solutions to the European unemployment problem?

Tax progression and training in a matching framework

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