Unifying Psychology: Shared Ontology and the Continuum of Practical Assumptions

Abstract

Critics have described psychology as a science impaired by disunity. The most recent special issue of Review of General Psychology sought to specifically address this concern, seeking perspectives from a wide range of theorists, each of whom offered their tradition's approach to how psychology as a whole may be integrated into a more unified whole. To continue this discussion, this article draws upon examples from the special issue, the disunity crisis literature, and wider writings in the philosophy of science, to explore the theoretical and conceptual divisions that foster ambiguity, confusion, and apparent irreconcilable differences between the disparate fields of psychology. The authors conclude that the majority of contemporary, scientific psychology is oriented toward a shared physical ontology, which can serve as a common grounding point from which the conceptual and theoretical differences of disparate fields may be meaningfully framed and evaluated. To this end, this article proposes that the various research traditions of psychology can be understood through their positions along a continuum of practical assumptions, which embodies the inherent conflict between two scientific priorities: metaphysical certainty (the safe end of the continuum) and practical experimental predictions (the risky end of the continuum). Three theoretical perspectives offered in the unification special issue are examined under this framework: situational realism (a distinctly safe approach), developmental evolutionary psychology (an intermediate approach), and the Tree of Knowledge unified theory (a relatively risky approach). The authors explore how the recommendations of each approach can be seen as a function of its position on the continuum of practical assumptions, and the implications of this understanding for future integrative efforts is discussed.

From Cronbach to Brunswik: A Conceptual Framework for Personality and Individual Differences Research

“…Probabilistic functionalism is a Darwinian approach to psychological phenomena and research methods developed by Egon Brunswik (1939). In common with other more recent proposals (see Petocz & Mackay, 2013;Marsh & Boag, 2014), Brunswik (1952) characterises psychological phenomena as situated within organism-environment relations. Brunswik's (1952) conceptual framework is novel in that: i) individual differences in psychological phenomena are understood as 6 situated in organism-environment relationships, with the organism and environment individually regarded as a unique and interacting system (Hammond, 1966); ii) it requires that variation in the environment is systematically tracked, with environmental variation considered as at least as important as variation both within and between, individuals.…”

Pluralidade de objeto versus pluralismo de concepções em teorias psicológicas

“…O grande avanço do debate é o entendimento de que a psicologia deve realmente incorporar tanto os métodos nomotéticos como os idiográficos. Do ponto de vista conceitual, o problema da grande incoerência entre teorias psicológicas está na falta de apreço aos estudos de ontologia (Ballantyne 1993;Marsh & Boag, 2014). Ontologia pode ser compreendida em seu significado genérico como referente à natureza comum de um dado objeto, Para Ballantyne (1993), o reconhecimento da premissa ontológica levaria a pluralidade de objetos sem inibir a expansão teórica e sem comprometer a unidade.…”

Rational, normative, descriptive, prescriptive, or choice behavior? The search for integrative metatheory of decision making.

“…Scholars have both lauded the emergence of rich systems of psychological thought during the discipline's short history and criticized the barriers to unifying psychology behind clear, accepted goals (for a review, see Marsh & Boag, 2014). Some barriers to integration and unification include, for example, the terminology used within the paradigm, standard assumptions of the subdiscipline, and the pervasive mental sets of theorists.…”