Understanding Hume's Natural History of Religion

Abstract

Hume's 'Natural History of Religion' offers a naturalized account of the causes of religious thought, an investigation into its 'origins' rather than its 'foundation in reason'. Hume thinks that if we consider only the causes of religious belief, we are provided with a reason to suspend the belief. I seek to explain why this is so, and what role the argument plays in Hume's wider campaign against the rational acceptability of religious belief. In particular, I argue that the work threatens a form of fideism which maintains that it is rationally permissible to maintain religious belief in the absence of evidence or of arguments in its favour. I also discuss the 'argument from common consent', and the relative superiority of Hume's account of the origins of religious belief.

Post-Religio Et Ratio: Relationship Between Reason and Religion in the Postmodern Study of Religions

“…Zira inancõn rasyonel unsurlarõnõ zaten skolastik düşŸnce ele almaktaydõ. 25 Bir başka ifadeyle Hume, rasyonel bir fideizme inanarak dinin, mŸspet bir kanõttan veya destekleyici bir argŸmandan yoksun olsa da rasyonel açõdan kabul edilebilir šzellikte olduğunu savundu. 26 Hume ÒvahyedilmişÓ yani Òmucizeye dayalõ din" diye isimlendirdiği Yahudi-Hristiyan (ve tabii ki İslam) geleneklerinin vahiy anlayõşlarõnõ (mesela Kitab-õ MukaddesÕi, KurÕan-õ KerimÕi hatta Vedalarõ) rasyonel açõdan tamamen reddederken Doğal Dinin TarihiÕnde ise insanõn din olgusunun makul kabul edilebilirliğini bilhassa ilk din kabul ettiği politeizmin kökeninden başlayarak sorgulamaktadõr.…”

Another look at Hume's treatment of the argument from design in theNatural History of Religion

“…According to Kail, the conclusion of Hume's account of the causes of religious belief in the first three sections of the NHR ‘is suspension of belief’ because ‘the account ‘rationally destabilizes’ belief concerning the content it explains’ (Kail (2007), 194). Hume's account argues that religious belief is based on an epistemically destabilizing source ‘awareness of which provides a reason to suspend the belief thus sourced’ ( ibid.…”

“…Polytheism is built on a foundation of fear and anxiety and held up by the faulty pillars of anthropomorphism. Beliefs acquired because they remove our anxiety about the future display ‘motivated irrationality’ (Kail (2007), 199). Monotheism derives its core content, belief in an invisible intelligent power, from this destabilizing source.…”

X-Berkeley, the Ends of Language, and thePrinciples of Human Knowledge

“…12 See Hume (1993). For discussion, see Kail (2007a), and in connection with the metaphor of projection see Kail (2007b, Part I). 13 I owe this point to Keith Allen.…”