This article argues that Hume's seemingly peculiar treatment of the argument from design in his Natural History of Religion is not indicative of a radical, or even modest, shift in his overall epistemic evaluation of it. His focus is on the argument's impact on the psychology of religious believers, and not its rational acceptability. Hume never strays far from his stated intention for the work, to engage in a socio-psychological analysis of the nature of religious belief, including a thorough assessment of the role of the argument from design. Hume concludes that the argument is inconsequential to religious belief formation.
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Emily Kelahan Hume's Treatise and the Theory of Ideas (Under the direction of Alan Nelson) Hume's Treatise of Human Nature has long been evaluated in terms of the skepticism-naturalism interpretive dichotomy. According to this interpretation, there are two distinct and often diametrically opposed Humes: a skeptic concerned to eradicate dubious metaphysical views and a naturalist concerned to develop a science of human nature. The skeptical Hume applies the theory of ideas developed in Book I of the Treatise to the phenomena he seeks to explain and nearly obliterates them. That leaves the science of human nature weak and without phenomena to explain in Books II and III. The naturalistic Hume, in contrast, is able to develop a robust science of human nature in Books II and III of the Treatise, but does so at the expense of completely abandoning the theory of ideas developed in Book I. In short, the familiar skepticism-naturalism interpretive dichotomy has it that Hume either successfully developed a science of human nature without the theory of ideas or else stubbornly held on to his theory of ideas at the cost of a robust science of human nature. This is a false dichotomy. There is one Hume, not two, who both adheres to the theory of ideas throughout the Treatise and develops a robust science of human nature. Hume accomplished much with little in his Treatise. Most importantly, he demolished extravagant metaphysical theories of various types and developed a robust science of human nature. Both feats were accomplished via his oft criticized, but little understood theory of iii ideas. Contrary to the prevailing opinion, the theory of ideas stands not in opposition to Hume's naturalistic project of developing a science of human nature, but rather is the foundation of that very project. I develop and defend an interpretation of Hume's theory of ideas according to which it succeeds in eradicating dubious metaphysical views, but also supports, rather than undermines his science of human nature. iv For my family, the very best parents, brother, and husband I could hope to have v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am grateful to all of the wonderful teachers, colleagues, friends, and family members who contributed so much to my development and well-being over the past six years at UNC and who made it possible for me to complete this dissertation. First, I would like to thank Alan Nelson, my tireless advisor and dissertation director, who beyond being brilliant was always extraordinarily patient and extremely generous with his time. I owe him a huge debt of gratitude. I am also grateful to the other members of my dissertation advisory committee: Bob Adams, David Reeve, Ram Neta, and Geoff Sayre-McCord. They were always willing to read my work and supplied a huge amount of valuable feedback. I have footnoted many of their specific contributions to my work throughout this dissertation, but I know I could not possibly have captured all of their suggestions, guidance, and encouragement. I feel incredibly fortunate to have teamed up with five ...
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