Uma nota sobre intensidade de supervisão nas indústrias brasileiras

Esteves, Luiz Alberto

doi:10.1590/s0034-71402006000300002

Cited by 6 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…The simultaneity associated with this choice creates problems in using variables related to supervision as proxies for labor effort, because the number of supervisors would not be an exogenous variable. As argued by Esteves (2006), it is difficult to justify that in the profit maximization process, firms can choose the wages, but do not have any control on the quantity of supervisors per employee.…”

Section: Endogeneity Issues Related To the Empirical Testing Of The Ementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Rebitzer (1995) tested the EW hypothesis for contract workers in the petrochemical industry and found a cleaner relationship between wages and supervision because there are specific institutional features surrounding the employment of such workers that guarantees the exogeneity of the monitoring variables. Esteves (2006) adopted the average job duration of supervisor workers for the Brazilian labor market, as an instrumental variable in a two-stage OLS estimation.…”

Section: Endogeneity Issues Related To the Empirical Testing Of The Ementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The problem with both proxies is that it is based on the restrictive hypothesis of exogeneity, when in the reality the amount of monitoring, supervisors and salaries are simultaneously determined by the firm. It is difficult to justify that in the profit maximization process, firms can choose the wages, but do not have any control on the quantity of supervisors per employee (Esteves, 2006).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Wage differentials by firm size: the efficiency wage test in a developing country

Menezes

Raposo

2014

Estud. Econ.

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Using data from the Brazilian Labor Monthly Survey (PME/ IBGE) for the years of 2006 and 2007, the paper investigates if the wage differential by firm size in Brazil can be explained by the predictions of the Efficiency Wage Theory. It is adopted a Switching Regression Model to estimate if large size companies pay a higher wage premium for dispended labor effort, as compared to smaller enterprises. The results prove the EW predictions since they evidence positive relationships between wages and labor effort, schooling and longer job duration. However, such findings are not sufficient to explain the existence of wage differentials by firm size in the Brazilian labor market. Keywordsefficiency wage, labor effort, firm size, wage differentials ResumoUsando dados da Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME/ IBGE) para os anos de 2006 e 2007, este artigo investiga se a diferença de salários por tamanho de firma no Brasil pode ser explicada pela Teoria do Salário Eficiência. Estimações de Switching Regression são utilizadas para verificar se as empresas de grande porte pagam um prêmio salarial maior aos seus funcionários por esforço despendido, comparativamente às pequenas empresas. Os resultados corroboram as predições do Salário Eficiência, uma vez que revelam uma relação positiva entre salário e esforço laboral e também entre escolaridade e duração no posto de trabalho. No entanto, esses resultados não são suficientes para explicar o diferencial de salários existente entre grandes e pequenas empresas no mercado de trabalho brasileiro. Palavras-Chavesalário eficiência, esforço laboral, tamanho da firma, diferenciais de salário Classificação JEL J01, J31Estud.

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Section: Endogeneity Issues Related To the Empirical Testing Of The Ementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Endogeneity Issues Related To the Empirical Testing Of The Ementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Wage differentials by firm size: the efficiency wage test in a developing country

Menezes

Raposo

2014

Estud. Econ.

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“…Workers with effort (e > 0) will always be employed at wage "w". On the other hand, the workers who choose the e = 0 strategy take the risk of being dismissed with a probability equals to "q" at each period (or unit) of time (Esteves, 2006).…”

Section: Shirking Model Methodology and Applicability In This Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficiency wage and work effort: Case study of a Brazilian multinational company

Fritoli¹,

Laffin²,

Bonacim³

et al. 2021

Afr. J. Bus. Manage.

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This research paper explores how employees of a multinational glass manufacturing company see the pay offered by the company and how it affects, directly or indirectly, their efforts to perform their duties. For this purpose, a case study was carried out in a glass manufacturing company located in the southernern region of Brazil throughout 2017. Literature review is focused on the theoretical model based on the idea that there is a positive variation of efforts with the company supervision intensity was tested, and it pointed out that the moral hazard of being caught shirking is related to supervision. Using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method, the relationship between wages and supervision intensity was empirically tested, according to the model suggested by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), in which there is a trade-off between supervision and actual wage. The results corroborate the efficiency wage theory: 90% of the sample consider extra benefits, besides the wages, important and only 2.02% consider the wage of the greatest motivator for continuing in the company. The analyses carried out in the research present striking data regarding the employees' perception of the benefits offered. That way, the loss of these benefits may affect the collaborators' efforts. Therefore, the company must concentrate on incentive strategies towards the benefits.

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“…So, this was a real and timely case study where it was possible to work with more data and in a smaller universe than that evaluated by Gatica et al (1995), Arbache (2001), Esteves (2006Esteves ( , 2008 and Uhr & Ziero (2011), who used aggregate and sectorial data from the Brazilian economy. Second, with the objective of evaluating the effect of the increased degree of supervision on Group 2, a natural experiment 12 , the authors opted to use the differences-in-differences method.…”

Section: Case Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Is there a trade-off between supervision and wage? Evidence from a metal mechanical firm in southern Brazil

Schmidt¹,

Teixeira²,

Ribeiro³

et al. 2017

Econ. Aplic.

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ResumoO objetivo deste trabalho é testar a existência do trade-off entre supervisão e salários em uma empresa do ramo metal mecânico no sul do Brasil. A metodologia utilizada para avaliar os efeitos sobre a produtividade e a eficiência dos trabalhadores foi o estimador de diferenças em diferenças. Avaliando os resultados, constatou-se que o aumento de supervisão gerou um aumento na produtividade entre 13,5% a 26,8%. Assim, com o aumento da produtividade, cabe à firma escolher entre aumentar o nível de supervisão ao custo de US$ 624,98 ou praticar salários eficiência ao custo de US$ 2.907,72.Palavras-chave: Salários eficiência. Supervisão. Insider Econometrics. AbstractThe objective of this work was to test the existence of a trade-off between supervision and wages in a metal mechanical firm in Southern Brazil. The methodology used to assess the effects on productivity and the worker efficiency was the differences-in-differences estimator. Evaluating the results, it was found that with increased supervision, there was an increase in productivity ranging between 13.5% and 26.8%. Therefore, with increased productivity, the company has to choose between increasing the level of supervision, at a cost of US$ 624.98 or practicing efficiency wages at a cost of US$ 2,907.72.

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Uma nota sobre intensidade de supervisão nas indústrias brasileiras

Cited by 6 publications

References 15 publications

Wage differentials by firm size: the efficiency wage test in a developing country

Wage differentials by firm size: the efficiency wage test in a developing country

Efficiency wage and work effort: Case study of a Brazilian multinational company

Is there a trade-off between supervision and wage? Evidence from a metal mechanical firm in southern Brazil

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