Ubiquity and efficiency of restrictions on informal punishment rights

Eriksson, Kimmo; Strimling, Pontus; Ehn, Micael

doi:10.1556/jep.11.2013.1.3

Cited by 14 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…However, it is clear that peer punishment may engender social costs and escalate conflicts within the group (Nikiforakis & Engelmann, 2011; Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008), and that it is often used with little regard for whether it benefits the group (Eriksson, Cownden, Ehn, & Strimling, 2014). Therefore, social discouragement of peer punishment might overall be a good thing (Eriksson, Strimling, & Ehn, 2013). After all, non-punitive alternatives such as gossip may be equally effective (Wu, Balliet, & Van Lange, 2016).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cultural Universals and Cultural Differences in Meta-Norms about Peer Punishment

et al. 2017

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Violators of cooperation norms may be informally punished by their peers. How such norm enforcement is judged by others can be regarded as a meta-norm (i.e., a second-order norm). We examined whether meta-norms about peer punishment vary across cultures by having students in eight countries judge animations in which an agent who over-harvested a common resource was punished either by a single peer or by the entire peer group. Whether the punishment was retributive or restorative varied between two studies, and findings were largely consistent across these two types of punishment. Across all countries, punishment was judged as more appropriate when implemented by the entire peer group than by an individual. Differences between countries were revealed in judgments of punishers vs. non-punishers. Specifically, appraisals of punishers were relatively negative in three Western countries and Japan, and more neutral in Pakistan, UAE, Russia, and China, consistent with the influence of individualism, power distance, and/or indulgence. Our studies constitute a first step in mapping how meta-norms vary around the globe, demonstrating both cultural universals and cultural differences.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cultural Universals and Cultural Differences in Meta-Norms about Peer Punishment

et al. 2017

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“…Compared to peer sanctioning systems, institutions in which a single person is responsible for punishment are less subject to coordination problems, over-punishment and the associated earnings losses (Eriksson, Strimling, and Ehn 2013;Grossman and Baldassarri 2012;O'Gorman, Henrich, and Van Vugt 2009). Just as importantly, sanctioning capacity in many real-world groups is centralized in a single individual or role-occupant, rather than distributed equally among all group members (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011;Eriksson and Strimling 2012;Guala 2012;Ostrom 2000).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Dynamics of Prosocial Leadership: Power and Influence in Collective Action Groups

Harrell

Simpson

2015

Social Forces

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prosocial-led groups as a whole are substantially more productive than proself-led groups. Indeed, as predicted, prosocial leaders were even more effective in maintaining large group contributions than the standard peer sanctioning system, where the ability to punish others is distributed equally among all group members. Importantly, these results suggest that prosocial leaders-but not proself leaders-are an effective solution to collective action problems. Therefore, I also address whether group members tend to select prosocials for leadership positions (Study 2a), and whether they are able to identify prosocials when all group members are able to compete for the leadership position by vying to be elected to the role (Study 2b). Results from these studies suggest that people prefer prosocials for the leader position, and that while group members do compete for leadership, both prosocial and proself individuals compete at similar rates, such that vi prosocials remain higher contributors than their proself counterparts. As a result, prosocials are particularly likely to be selected for leadership positions when group contributions are known. Study 2b also demonstrates that groups that hold democratic elections for leadership may induce more cooperative behavior in their members not only once the leader is installed, but even before leadership hierarchies emerge as a result of competition to be elected. Taken as a whole, the findings suggest that putting power and influence in the right hands solves collective action problems and promotes collective welfare. Leadership-specifically, democratically elected, prosocial leadershippromises an effective solution to collective action problems.vii

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“…Thus, there is very limited research on how peer punishment of norm violators is viewed in real life. Recently this question has been approached using cross-cultural online surveys (Eriksson, Strimling, & Ehn, 2013; Strimling & Eriksson, 2014). Consistent with the findings in economic games, survey respondents tended to disapprove of peer punishers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moderators of the disapproval of peer punishment

Eriksson

Andersson

Strimling

2015

Group Processes & Intergroup Relations

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Recent studies have found disapproval of peer punishment of norm violations. This seems puzzling, given the potential benefits peer punishers contribute to the group. We suggest part of the answer is that peer punishers tend to come across as aggressive and as such may be viewed as more problematic than beneficial to have around. We used simple computer animations of geometric shapes to enact 15 precise variations of social sanctions against a norm violator. More than 1,800 subjects were recruited to watch an animation and judge the behavior and character of the animated agents. They also completed a trait aggression measure. Across the variations peer punishment was typically disapproved of, especially when severe or openly aggressive, and especially by subjects low on trait aggression. We conclude that there seems to be a social norm against peer punishment and that dislike of aggressiveness seems to be part of the reason why.

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Ubiquity and efficiency of restrictions on informal punishment rights

Abstract: The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the published version of record.

Cited by 14 publications

References 21 publications

Cultural Universals and Cultural Differences in Meta-Norms about Peer Punishment

Cultural Universals and Cultural Differences in Meta-Norms about Peer Punishment

The Dynamics of Prosocial Leadership: Power and Influence in Collective Action Groups

Moderators of the disapproval of peer punishment

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