Moderators of the disapproval of peer punishment

Abstract

Recent studies have found disapproval of peer punishment of norm violations. This seems puzzling, given the potential benefits peer punishers contribute to the group. We suggest part of the answer is that peer punishers tend to come across as aggressive and as such may be viewed as more problematic than beneficial to have around. We used simple computer animations of geometric shapes to enact 15 precise variations of social sanctions against a norm violator. More than 1,800 subjects were recruited to watch an animation and judge the behavior and character of the animated agents. They also completed a trait aggression measure. Across the variations peer punishment was typically disapproved of, especially when severe or openly aggressive, and especially by subjects low on trait aggression. We conclude that there seems to be a social norm against peer punishment and that dislike of aggressiveness seems to be part of the reason why.

Preschoolers value those who sanction non-cooperators

“…Since such punishment is more costly for the enforcer but also more harmful for the transgressor, 5-yearolds may find it more challenging to judge active punishment as positively as they judged the reprimanding in the present study. Indeed, even adults seem to disapprove of severe or overly aggressive punishment of norm violators (Eriksson et al, 2016). Thus, the capacity that 5-year-olds demonstrated in our study may not generalize to more severe forms of norm enforcement.…”

“…A few empirical studies have examined the question of how costly norm enforcement could be sustained (e.g., Barclay, 2006;Horita, 2010;Kiyonari & Barclay, 2008;Nelissen, 2008) and have shown that enforcers do typically receive more reputational and material benefits than non-enforcers (though these effects are not unequivocal and adults may even disapprove of particularly severe or aggressive norm enforcement; Eriksson, Andersson, & Strimling, 2016). However, these studies have all involved adults, leaving unclear when in ontogeny this solution to the problem of second-order cooperation becomes functional.…”

Cortical thickness of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex predicts strategic choices in economic games

“…A finding that disrupting the DLPFC made UG responders more accepting of unfair offers (10) seems to contradict the current findings if rejection of unfair UG offers is considered a norm-enforcing behavior. However, the latter assumption has been increasingly criticized (40,(44)(45)(46)(47)(48)(49), and the critics provide evidence that rejection of unfair offers as emotion-based aggression is against the dominant social norm, at least in highly industrialized societies (40,44,45,48,49), and is instead a long-term strategy to protect oneself from possible future exploitation by others (47,48). From this alternative view, not rejecting and accepting the disadvantageous offer is an internalized and intuitive norm-abiding behavior that must be controlled to execute strategies to protect the player's reputation and standing (47)(48)(49).…”

Social norms are enforced by friends: The effect of relationship closeness on bystanders’ tendency to confront perpetrators of uncivil, immoral, and discriminatory behaviors

“…This particular form of communication is frequently referred to as "social control" (Brauer & Chekroun, 2005), but has also been called "speaking up" (Morrison & Milliken, 2000), "confronting the person" (Rattan & Dweck, 2010), "social sanctions" (Eriksson, Andersson, & Strimling, 2015), "pressure to conform" (Schachter, 1951), "altruistic punishment" (Balafoutas, Nikiforakis, & Rockenbach, 2016), "moral criticism" (Voiklis & Malle, 2016), "norm enforcement" (Horne, 2009), and "civil courage" (Greitemeyer, Osswald, Fischer, & Frey, 2007). This particular form of communication is frequently referred to as "social control" (Brauer & Chekroun, 2005), but has also been called "speaking up" (Morrison & Milliken, 2000), "confronting the person" (Rattan & Dweck, 2010), "social sanctions" (Eriksson, Andersson, & Strimling, 2015), "pressure to conform" (Schachter, 1951), "altruistic punishment" (Balafoutas, Nikiforakis, & Rockenbach, 2016), "moral criticism" (Voiklis & Malle, 2016), "norm enforcement" (Horne, 2009), and "civil courage" (Greitemeyer, Osswald, Fischer, & Frey, 2007).…”

“…When witnessing a behavior that transgresses social norms or moral standards, bystanders sometimes communicate to the perpetrator that his or her behavior is wrong. This particular form of communication is frequently referred to as "social control" (Brauer & Chekroun, 2005), but has also been called "speaking up" (Morrison & Milliken, 2000), "confronting the person" (Rattan & Dweck, 2010), "social sanctions" (Eriksson, Andersson, & Strimling, 2015), "pressure to conform" (Schachter, 1951), "altruistic punishment" (Balafoutas, Nikiforakis, & Rockenbach, 2016), "moral criticism" (Voiklis & Malle, 2016), "norm enforcement" (Horne, 2009), and "civil courage" (Greitemeyer, Osswald, Fischer, & Frey, 2007). Social control perpetuates social norms (Gibbs, 1981) and promotes prosocial behaviors (Yamagishi, 1986).…”