“Two Minds Don’t Blink Alike”: The Attentional Blink Does Not Occur in a Joint Context

Abstract

Typically, when two individuals perform a task together, each partner monitors the other partners’ responses and goals to ensure that the task is completed efficiently. This monitoring is thought to involve a co-representation of the joint goals and task, as well as a simulation of the partners’ performance. Evidence for such “co-representation” of goals and task, and “simulation” of responses has come from numerous visual attention studies in which two participants complete different components of the same task. In the present research, an adaptation of the attentional blink task was used to determine if co-representation could exert an influence over the associated attentional mechanisms. Participants completed a rapid serial visual presentation task in which they first identified a target letter (T1) and then detected the presence of the letter X (T2) presented one to seven letters after T1. In the individual condition, the participant identified T1 and then detected T2. In the joint condition, one participant identified T1 and the other participant detected T2. Across two experiments, an attentional blink (decreased accuracy in detecting T2 when presented three letters after T1) was observed in the individual condition, but not in joint conditions. A joint attentional blink may not emerge because the co-representation mechanisms that enable joint action exert a stronger influence at information processing stages that do not overlap with those that lead to the attentional blink.

The role of individual differences in attentional blink phenomenon and real-time-strategy game proficiency

“…An attentional blink effect was detected with mean T2 detection rates from both sessions at Lag 2 being lower than at Lag 1, t(83) ¼ -3.746, p < .001, 95% CI of Lag 2/Lag 1 difference [ 24.198, -7.415], and at Lag 7, t(83) ¼ -5.955, p < .001, 95% CI of Lag 2/Lag 7 difference [ 31.119, -15.438], which stands in agreement with the literature (e.g. Constable et al, 2018;Kranczioch et al, 2003). Due to the fact that attentional blink effect was confirmed, behavioral data were analyzed using a 4 (Lag: lag 1 vs lag 2 vs lag 7 vs No T2) x 2 (Sessions: pre-training vs post-training) x 2 (Group: Fixed vs Variable) repeated-measures ANOVA, with Lag and Session as the within-subjects factors, Group as the between subjects factor and accuracy as a dependent variable.…”

Relevant for us? We-prioritization in cognitive processing.

“…For example, it is thought that humans spontaneously represent other’s tasks much as they would their own (Elekes, Bródy, Halász, & Király, 2016; Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003; Welsh & McDougall, 2012) and in certain situations may covertly simulate the perceptual (Constable, Pratt, Gozli, & Welsh, 2015) and/or bodily states of another person (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000). Although initiation of such processes is dependent on specific task demands (Constable et al, 2017, 2015; Constable, Pratt, & Welsh, 2018; van der Wel & Fu, 2015), dyads might corepresent each other’s tasks even to the detriment of individual performance (Sebanz et al, 2003; Welsh et al, 2005).…”

Sticking together? Re-binding previous other-associated stimuli interferes with self-verification but not partner-verification

“…Yet, some select studies demonstrate that joint action mechanisms might be situationally dependent. That is, cues to an active partner and their cognitive state in a joint task might create a common perceptual ground that ultimately facilitates interacting within a shared environment (Tollefsen, 2005), but these cues might selectively be used to activate relevant joint action mechanisms (Constable et al, 2015(Constable et al, , 2018. To elaborate, creating a space for action (Bhatia et al, 2019;Welsh et al, 2020) or a space for perception (Constable et al, 2015) via different action or postural cues may lead to different perceptual biases in an agent but also in an engaged observer.…”

“…For example, a joint psychological refractory period is not elicited spontaneously, but can be observed when participants were required to monitor their partner's task (Liepelt & Prinz, 2011). Similarly, no joint attentional blink can be detected (Constable et al, 2018). In the case of the attentional blink, even when participants were asked to actively monitor their task-partner's task no evidence of co-representation was obtained.…”