Truth promoting non-evidential reasons for belief

Talbot, Brian

doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0139-1

Cited by 25 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…22 For arguments that there aren't epistemic values that call for promotion, see Littlejohn (2018). For a defence of an opposing view, see Talbot (2014). While I think that there might be a sense in which epistemic norms are sensitive to considerations about value (and hence might be thought of as teleological), the relevant values might not be ones that call for promotion.…”

Section: What Should Pro We Believe?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5 For discussions of trade-offs and their (ir)relevance to epistemic status, seeFirth (1981),Jenkins (2007), andLittlejohn (2012). For sophisticated responses to such concerns, see Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn (2014),Singer (2018), andTalbot (2014).6 This view is compatible with the view that a thinker's evidence ultimately determines what a thinker should believe. We can represent the evidentialist as someone who thinks that what we ought to believe is determined by what we have sufficient evidence to believe.…”

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confidence: 96%

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On What We Should Believe (and When (and Why) We Should Believe What We Know We Should Not Believe)

Littlejohn¹

2020

Epistemic Duties

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Section: What Should Pro We Believe?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 96%

On What We Should Believe (and When (and Why) We Should Believe What We Know We Should Not Believe)

Littlejohn¹

2020

Epistemic Duties

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“…Jonathan Matheson (2015: 145 ff.) calls the type of considerations that arise from this ‘instrumental epistemic reasons’; Brian Talbot (2014) calls them ‘truth-promoting non-evidential reasons for belief’; Kirk Lougheed and Robert Simpson (Forthcoming) call them ‘indirect epistemic reasons’. It seems plausible that such considerations can at least sometimes be regarded as reasons for belief of some sort, and so perhaps in a case like DETECTIVES an agent could appeal to them to resolve the pragmatic deadlocks I've adverted to.…”

Section: The Limitations Of Standards-based Permissivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Permissivism and the Arbitrariness Objection

Simpson¹

2016

Episteme

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Permissivism says that for some propositions and bodies of evidence, there is more than one rationally permissible doxastic attitude that can be taken towards that proposition given the evidence. Some critics of this view argue that it condones, as rationally acceptable, sets of attitudes that manifest an untenable kind of arbitrariness. I begin by providing a new and more detailed explication of what this alleged arbitrariness consists in. I then explain why Miriam Schoenfield's prima facie promising attempt to answer the Arbitrariness Objection, by appealing to the role of epistemic standards in rational belief formation, fails to resolve the problem. Schoenfield's strategy is, however, a useful one, and I go on to explain how an alternative form of the standards-based approach to Permissivism – one that emphasizes the significance of the relationship between people's cognitive abilities and the epistemic standards that they employ – can respond to the arbitrariness objection.

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“…Brian Talbot, in defending a form of epistemic consequentialism that's complementary to our position here, rejects Adler's view on this matter. For Talbot, reasons generated by indirect epistemic considerations and reasons grounded in routine appraisals of evidence can exert their normative force on people's beliefs in harmony with one another, insofar as both kinds of reasons ultimately derive from, and operate in the service of, the same epistemic ends (Talbot (2014), 615–616) 21 . Although we're sympathetic to this suggestion, we also think it makes matters sound implausibly smooth and simple.…”

Section: Taking Account Of Indirect Epistemic Reasons As Reasons For mentioning

confidence: 99%

Indirect epistemic reasons and religious belief

Lougheed

Simpson

2016

Rel. Stud.

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If believing P will result in epistemically good outcomes, does this generate an epistemic reason to believe P, or just a pragmatic reason? Conceiving of such reasons as epistemic reasons seems to lead to absurdity, e.g. by allowing that someone can rationally hold beliefs that conflict with her assessment of her evidence's probative force. We explain how this and other intuitively unwelcome results can be avoided. We also suggest a positive case for conceiving of such reasons as epistemic reasons, namely, that they exhibit a form of interpersonal normative parity that's typical of epistemic reasons but not pragmatic reasons. We then link this discussion to religious belief, suggesting that there are sometimes indirect epistemic reasons for religious belief, and that certain characterizations of religious belief are instructive in thinking about how to take account of indirect epistemic reasons.

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Truth promoting non-evidential reasons for belief

Cited by 25 publications

References 23 publications

On What We Should Believe (and When (and Why) We Should Believe What We Know We Should Not Believe)

On What We Should Believe (and When (and Why) We Should Believe What We Know We Should Not Believe)

Permissivism and the Arbitrariness Objection

Indirect epistemic reasons and religious belief

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