Indirect epistemic reasons and religious belief

Lougheed, Kirk; Simpson, R. Mark

doi:10.1017/s0034412516000202

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…17 This particular intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is inspired by Steel (2010), though I develop it differently. Lougheed and Simpson (2017) propose a similar distinction. 18 Several philosophers have pointed to considerations that I think are extrinsic epistemic reasons, e.g., McKinnon's (2015) "distal" epistemic considerations.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 88%

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Endorsement and assertion

Fleisher

2019

Nous

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Scientists, philosophers, and other researchers commonly assert their theories. This is surprising, as there are good reasons for skepticism about theories in cutting-edge research. I propose a new account of assertion in research contexts that vindicates these assertions. This account appeals to a distinct propositional attitude called endorsement, which is the rational attitude of committed advocacy researchers have to their theories. The account also appeals to a theory of conversational pragmatics known as the Question Under Discussion model, or QUD. Hence, I call the theory the EQUD model. Motivating this account is a recognition that the speech act of assertion has two roles to play in research contexts. The first is the advocacy role, in which researchers assert a theory in order to advocate for it. The second is the evidential role, which is used to add to the common stock of information available to a field of inquiry. The EQUD model provides an account of warranted assertion for both these roles in research contexts. This success provides support for the theory of endorsement. It also provides support for information updating accounts of assertion.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 88%

“…1717This particular intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is inspired by Steel (2010), though I develop it differently. Lougheed and Simpson (2017) propose a similar distinction.…”

mentioning

confidence: 91%

Endorsement and assertion

Fleisher

2019

Nous

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“…As noted above, for example, Christians believe in the final judgment and a future life in heaven after death, and Muslims believe that they will spend eternity with Allah in the hereafter. These examples illustrate how people can believe in concepts that extend into the future for nonevidence-based reasons (Longheed & Simpson, 2017). People can hold religious or political beliefs without any explicit awareness of their structure in a manner similar to how they can use language without metacognitive awareness of its grammatical rules (Claessens et al, 2020).…”

Section: Social Consequences Of Conceptual Beliefsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Manifestations, social impact, and decay of conceptual beliefs: A cultural perspective

Seitz,

Paloutzian,

Angel

2024

Brain and Behavior

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IntroductionBelieving comprises multifaceted processes that integrate information from the outside world through meaning‐making processes with personal relevance.MethodsQualitative Review of the current literature in social cognitive neuroscience.ResultsAlthough believing develops rapidly outside an individual's conscious awareness, it results in the formation of beliefs that are stored in memory and play an important role in determining an individual's behavior. Primal beliefs reflect an individual's experience of objects and events, whereas conceptual beliefs are based on narratives that are held in social groups. Conceptual beliefs can be about autobiographical, political, religious, and other aspects of life and may be encouraged by participation in group rituals. We hypothesize that assertions of future gains and rewards that transcend but are inherent in these codices provide incentives to follow the norms and rules of social groups.ConclusionThe power of conceptual beliefs to provide cultural orientation is likely to fade when circumstances and evidence make it clear that what was asserted no longer applies.

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“…Jonathan Matheson (2015: 145 ff.) calls the type of considerations that arise from this ‘instrumental epistemic reasons’; Brian Talbot (2014) calls them ‘truth-promoting non-evidential reasons for belief’; Kirk Lougheed and Robert Simpson (Forthcoming) call them ‘indirect epistemic reasons’. It seems plausible that such considerations can at least sometimes be regarded as reasons for belief of some sort, and so perhaps in a case like DETECTIVES an agent could appeal to them to resolve the pragmatic deadlocks I've adverted to.…”

Section: The Limitations Of Standards-based Permissivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Permissivism and the Arbitrariness Objection

Simpson¹

2016

Episteme

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Permissivism says that for some propositions and bodies of evidence, there is more than one rationally permissible doxastic attitude that can be taken towards that proposition given the evidence. Some critics of this view argue that it condones, as rationally acceptable, sets of attitudes that manifest an untenable kind of arbitrariness. I begin by providing a new and more detailed explication of what this alleged arbitrariness consists in. I then explain why Miriam Schoenfield's prima facie promising attempt to answer the Arbitrariness Objection, by appealing to the role of epistemic standards in rational belief formation, fails to resolve the problem. Schoenfield's strategy is, however, a useful one, and I go on to explain how an alternative form of the standards-based approach to Permissivism – one that emphasizes the significance of the relationship between people's cognitive abilities and the epistemic standards that they employ – can respond to the arbitrariness objection.

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Indirect epistemic reasons and religious belief

Cited by 11 publications

References 32 publications

Endorsement and assertion

Endorsement and assertion

Manifestations, social impact, and decay of conceptual beliefs: A cultural perspective

Permissivism and the Arbitrariness Objection

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