Truth-bearers and the Liar - a reply to Alan Weir

Goldstein, Laurence

doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00280

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…They are determined, so far as they are determined at all, by such things as the previous course of the conversation that is still going on at the context, the states of mind of the participants, and the conspicuous aspects of their surroundings. (Lewis, 1998, 28-29 A similar view was defended by Goldstein (2000Goldstein ( , 2001, who argued that no statement is made by the liar and the truth-teller sentences. He gave a rather different justification for the claim that no proposition is expressed.…”

Section: The Motivation To Deny That There Is a Propositionmentioning

confidence: 87%

“…Although Goldstein (2000Goldstein ( , 2001) offered a distinct explanation from the deflationist's of why no statement is made by a use of a liar sentence, and although Valor Abad and Martínez Fernández (2009)'s reply is specifically directed at Goldstein's cassatio approach, their rejoinder illustrates a type of response to the strategy of denying that paradoxical sentences express propositions. The type of strategy consists in using the justification of the restriction to generate a new strengthened paradox.…”

Section: The Motivation To Deny That There Is a Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are also examples of metarepresentational echoic uses of expressions that do not involve negation. In the following dialogue, A overhears the conver-sation between B and C, where they use a pejorative to refer to A: I am assuming, with Beall (2001), Asay (2015), and Goldstein (2000Goldstein ( , 2001, that the minimalist has ways to justify the claim that the liar-like sentences express no proposition. I don't want to commit to any single justification of this claim.…”

Section: Negation and Denialmentioning

confidence: 99%

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This is not an instance of (E)

Marques

2016

Synthese

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Semantic paradoxes like the liar are notorious challenges to truth theories. A paradox can be phrased with minimal resources and minimal assumptions. It is not surprising, then, that the liar is also a challenge to minimalism about truth. Horwich (1990) deals swiftly with the paradox, after discriminating between other strategies for avoiding it without compromising minimalism. He dismisses the denial of classical logic, the denial that the concept of truth can coherently be applied to propositions, and the denial that the liar sentence expresses a proposition, but he endorses the denial that the liar is an acceptable instance of the equivalence schema (E). This paper has two main parts. It first shows that Horwich's preferred denial is also problematic. As Simmons (1999), Beall and Armour-Garb (2003), and Asay (2015) argued, the solution is ad hoc, faces a possible loss of expressibility, and is ultimately unstable. Finally, the paper explores a different combination of possibilities for minimalism: treating the truth-predicate as context-dependent, rejecting the notion that the liar expresses a proposition, and reinterpreting negation in some contexts as metalinguistic denial. The paper argues that these are preferable options, but signposts possible dangers ahead.

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Section: The Motivation To Deny That There Is a Propositionmentioning

confidence: 87%

Section: The Motivation To Deny That There Is a Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Negation and Denialmentioning

confidence: 99%

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This is not an instance of (E)

Marques

2016

Synthese

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“…Various problems confront attempted consistent solutions to the inconsistent semantic pathology exhibited by the liar paradox and its ilk-from the revenge-susceptibility of these proffered solutions, to the self-thwarting restrictions they place on expressibility, to their flagrant ad hockery (e.g., unmotivated declarations of the meaninglessness of otherwise semantically pathological sentences (Cf. Sorensen, 2005;Goldstein, 2001 and2002)). On the other hand, as we have shown elsewhere, 55 there is no viable means by which dialetheism can resolve the indeterminate semantic pathology that the asymmetric variants of the open pair present.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Liars, truthtellers, and naysayers: A broader view of semantic pathology I

Armour‐Garb

Woodbridge

2012

Language & Communication

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“…Some decades ago, Ryle (1950) defended views on paradoxes quite akin to the cassantes position. More recently, Smiley (1993), Beall (2001) and mainly Goldstein (2001;2007) have defended versions of this position. Beall (2001) enlists the second sense of 'saying nothing' outlined above to conclude that the usual paradoxical sentences are meaningless, which he does in connection with deflationist theories of truth (see Armour-Garb 2001 for a critique of Beall's position).…”

Section: Cassantesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Comparative Taxonomy of Medieval and Modern Approaches to Liar Sentences

Novaes

2008

History and Philosophy of Logic

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Two periods in the history of logic and philosophy are characterized notably by vivid interest in selfreferential paradoxical sentences in general, and Liar sentences in particular: the later medieval period (roughly from the 12 th to the 15 th century), and the last hundred years. In this paper, I undertake a comparative taxonomy of these two traditions. I outline and discuss eight main approaches to Liar sentences in the medieval tradition, and compare them to the most influential modern approaches to such sentences. I also emphasize the aspects of each tradition that find no counterpart in the other one. It is expected that such a comparison may point in new directions for future research on the paradoxes; indeed, the present analysis allows me to draw a few conclusions about the general nature of Liar sentences, and to identify aspects that would require further investigation.

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Truth-bearers and the Liar - a reply to Alan Weir

Cited by 7 publications

References 2 publications

This is not an instance of (E)

This is not an instance of (E)

Liars, truthtellers, and naysayers: A broader view of semantic pathology I

A Comparative Taxonomy of Medieval and Modern Approaches to Liar Sentences

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