A Comparative Taxonomy of Medieval and Modern Approaches to Liar Sentences

Abstract

Two periods in the history of logic and philosophy are characterized notably by vivid interest in selfreferential paradoxical sentences in general, and Liar sentences in particular: the later medieval period (roughly from the 12 th to the 15 th century), and the last hundred years. In this paper, I undertake a comparative taxonomy of these two traditions. I outline and discuss eight main approaches to Liar sentences in the medieval tradition, and compare them to the most influential modern approaches to such sentences. I also emphasize the aspects of each tradition that find no counterpart in the other one. It is expected that such a comparison may point in new directions for future research on the paradoxes; indeed, the present analysis allows me to draw a few conclusions about the general nature of Liar sentences, and to identify aspects that would require further investigation.

Conditionals in Theories of Truth

“…Note finally that C 0 is sound for non-finite definitions also, but it fails to be complete for them. 20 For further information about C 0 and about the revision theory of finite and other definitions, see Gupta and Belnap [34], Martinez [44], and Gupta [32].…”

“…See Feferman [22] and Cantini [15] for references. See Dutilh Novaes [20] for a historical comparison. Recent contributors include Brady [10], Beall [7], Zardini [81], and Bacon [5].…”

"Tvrdé jádro" logiky a sémantické paradoxy. Konfrontace scholastického a moderního přístupu.

“…12 Obecně ke Swyneshedově sémantice srv Spade (1983), (1997,. s. 250-251), (2007), Dutilh Novaes (2008a,Uckelman (2009, s. 103-120), ke swyneshedovské tradici v pozdněstředověké a post-středověké scholastice srv Ashworth (1972),Ashworth a Spade (1992)…”