In this rigorous investigation into the logic of truth Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap explain how the concept of truth works in both ordinary and pathological contexts. The latter include, for instance, contexts that generate Liar Paradox. Their central claim is that truth is a circular concept. In support of this claim they provide a widely applicable theory (the "revision theory") of circular concepts. Under the revision theory, when truth is seen as circular both its ordinary features and its pathological features fall into a simple understandable pattern. The Revision Theory of Truth is unique in placing truth in the context of a general theory of definitions. This theory makes sense of arbitrary systems of mutually interdependent concepts, of which circular concepts, such as truth, are but a special case. Bradford Books imprint

Throughout much of this century there have been two types of philosophical debates over the concept of truth. In the first, substantive, type of debate we find rival theories of truth put forward that seem to have, and whose proponents have taken them to have, significant metaphysical and epistemological implications. An early example of this type is the debate in the early 1900s between the British Idealists (F. H. Bradley and his followers) and the Logical Atomists (Bertrand Russell and his followers). The Idealists defended a coherence theory of truth, whereas the Atomists argued for a correspondence theory. This dispute over the theory of truth was not, and was not taken by the participants to be, a local disagreement. It was integral to the larger metaphysical debate between the two sides over monism and pluralism and over idealism and realism. A recent example of the substantive type is the debate between the realist and the anti-realist found in Michael Dummett's writings. The crux of the debate here is what notion of truth is admissible. Dummett's anti-realist argues for a notion of truth that is constrained by evidence, while the realist defends the admissibility of a radically non-epistemic notion. In the first type of debate, then, we find theses put forward and defended that have (or at least seem to have) substantial philosophical implications.

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