Think Twice, It's All Right: Animalism, Disunity and the Self

Geddes, A. E. M.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9264.2013.00359.x

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback)

2013

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2013.00359.x

|View full text |Cite

Think Twice, It's All Right: Animalism, Disunity and the Self

A. E. M. Geddes

Abstract: According to animalism, each of us is numerically identical to a human animal. Disunity cases—cases in which a human animal lacks some form of mental unity—are often thought to pose a problem for animalism. Tim Bayne (2010) has recently offered some novel arguments against animalism based on one particular disunity case, namely Cerberus: a single animal with two heads, each housing its own stream of consciousness. I show that Bayne's arguments are flawed, and that animalism is capable of handling the case.

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Year Published

2014

2017

Publication Types

Select...

Article3

Relationship

Self Cite0

Independent3

Authors

Journals

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 7 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Bayne says that the organism that bears self-representations does not have the features essential to performing the 'self role'. Geddes (2013) responds that these features needn't be regarded as essential, and that the more appropriate response to Bayne's argument is to revise our understanding of the self role in order to retain the idea that the self is identical with the organism.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Against Virtual Selves

McClelland

2017

Erkenn

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

According to the virtual self theory (VST), selves are merely virtual entities. On this view, our self-representations do not refer to any concrete object and the self is a merely intentional entity. This contemporary version of the 'no-self' theory is driven by a number of psychological and philosophical considerations indicating that our representations of the self are pervasively inaccurate. I present two problems for VST. First, the case for VST fails to rule out a more moderate position according to which the self exists but is systematically misrepresented by us. This position regards the self as a real entity that has illusory appearances, rather than as a hallucinated entity that has a merely intentional existence. Second, I suggest that this 'illusion model' of self-misrepresentation is preferable to VST. Advocates of VST must acknowledge the existence of an entity-typically the brain-that is the bearer of our misrepresentations of the self. I argue that, other things being equal, we should regard the bearer of our self-representations as the self, even if that entity diverges dramatically from the way we represent the self to be. So by acknowledging the existence of a bearer of selfrepresentations, advocates of VST are in a poor position to deny the existence of the self. I conclude that VST not only fails to rule out the illusion model, but that we have prima facie reason to prefer the illusion model to VST.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Against Virtual Selves

McClelland

2017

Erkenn

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…I don't understand this view well enough to say anything sensible about it. Geddes is a good critical discussion of Bayne's arguments.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Metaphysical Implications of Conjoined Twinning

Olson¹

2014

The Southern J of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Animalism

Bailey

2015

Philosophy Compass

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Among your closest associates is a certain human animala living, breathing, organism. You see it when you look in the mirror ( go ahead; take a look). When it is sick, you don't feel too well. Where it goes, you go. And, one thinks, where you go, it must follow. Indeed, you can make it move through sheer force of will. You bear, in short, an important and intimate relation to this, your animal. So too rest of us with our animals. Animalism says that this relation is nothing short of identity. According to animalists, we do not only coincide with or constitute or inhabit or otherwise hang out with these close associates, our animals: we are them. In this article, I offer an opinionated take on what animalism might be and situate it against contemporary rivals. Then, I outline a simple case for animalism. Finally, I sketch nonstandard routes for animalists to take in light of standard challenges. My goal in all of this is to open up some new avenues of animalist thinking.868 Animalism

show abstract

scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.

Contact Info

hi@scite.ai

10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614

Henderson, NV 89052, USA

Blog Terms and Conditions API Terms Privacy Policy Contact Cookie Preferences Do Not Sell or Share My Personal Information

Made with 💙 for researchers

Part of the Research Solutions Family.

Think Twice, It's All Right: Animalism, Disunity and the Self

Cited by 3 publications

References 7 publications

Against Virtual Selves

Against Virtual Selves

The Metaphysical Implications of Conjoined Twinning

Animalism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About