Against Virtual Selves

McClelland, Tom

doi:10.1007/s10670-017-9945-8

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…To the extent that instances of self-consciousness have correctness conditions, it might be the case that no such experience is veridical. For example, instances of self-consciousness might systematically misrepresent some existing entity as the self, by analogy with perceptual illusions (McClelland, 2019); or represent a wholly non-existent entity as the self, by analogy with perceptual hallucinations (Bayne, 2010;Metzinger, 2003). In other words, "self-consciousness" need not be a success term.…”

Section: Getting Clearer On Self-consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

varieties of selflessness

Millière

2020

PhiMiSci

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Many authors argue that conscious experience involves a sense of self or self-consciousness. According to the strongest version of this claim, there can be no selfless states of consciousness, namely states of consciousness that lack self-consciousness altogether. Disagreements about this claim are likely to remain merely verbal as long as the target notion of self-consciousness is not adequately specified. After distinguishing six notions of self-consciousness commonly discussed in the literature, I argue that none of the corresponding features is necessary for consciousness, because there are states of consciousness in which each of them is plausibly missing. Such states can be said to be at least partially selfless, since they lack at least one of the ways in which one could be self-conscious. Furthermore, I argue that there is also preliminary empirical evidence that some states of consciousness lack all of these six putative forms of self-consciousness. Such states might be totally selfless, insofar as they lack all the ways in which one could be self-conscious. I conclude by addressing four objections to the possibility and reportability of totally selfless states of consciousness.

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Section: Getting Clearer On Self-consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

varieties of selflessness

Millière

2020

PhiMiSci

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“…For review and discussion seeMcClelland (2019).13 An anonymous referee has suggested an interesting alternative explanation, compatible with objectual representation -as in, for example,Woźniak (2018): the inability to recognize a special and (near-) ubiquitous feature. I see two problems with this explanation.…”

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confidence: 99%

Perspectival self-consciousness and ego-dissolution

Sebastián

2020

PhiMiSci

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It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary experiences. I will argue that it should be understood as Perspectival First-Person Awareness (PFP-Awareness): a non-conceptual identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for our conscious experience. I will offer a detailed characterization of PFP-Awareness in semantic and epistemological terms. With this tool in hand, I will review the empirical literature on altered states. I will focus on psychedelics, meditation and dreams, as they have been claimed to present the clearest cases in favor of a radical disruption of self-awareness. I will show that the rejection of the idea that minimal self-awareness is constitutive of our experience on the basis of this evidence is unfounded, for two main reasons. First, although there are good grounds to think that some forms of self-awareness that typically accompany our ordinary experiences are compromised, they do not support the claim that PFP-Awareness is absent. Secondly, the reports that could make us think of a radical disruption of self-awareness are most probably due to a confirmation bias – and hence we should mistrust them – derived from the expectations and metaphysical views of their subjects.

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Against Virtual Selves

Cited by 2 publications

References 12 publications

varieties of selflessness

varieties of selflessness

Perspectival self-consciousness and ego-dissolution

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