Abstract:Conjoined twinning is said to show that the number of human people-the number of us-can differ from the number of human organisms, and hence that we are not organisms. The paper shows that these arguments either assume the point at issue, rely on dubious and undefended assumptions, or add nothing to more familiar arguments for the same conclusion.
“…No organism could ever think or be conscious, and no thinking or conscious being could ever be an organism (except in the derivative sense in which an immaterial substance can “be” an organism). (Olson, manuscript, 13)The first “abominable” implication is that if we accept there are expansive brains, then we must accept that it is metaphysically impossible for animals to have rich psychological properties.…”
Section: Animalist Arguments Against Thinking Brains: Olson's New Objmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…No organism could ever think or be conscious, and no thinking or conscious being could ever be an organism (except in the derivative sense in which an immaterial substance can “be” an organism). (Olson, manuscript, 13)…”
Section: Animalist Arguments Against Thinking Brains: Olson's New Objmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Mind and life—life in the biological sense—are metaphysically incompatible. (Olson, manuscript, 4)The second “abominable” implication is thus that if expansive brains exist, then no living individual has mental properties, and we have a separation between, as Olson puts it, “mind and life.”…”
Section: Animalist Arguments Against Thinking Brains: Olson's New Objmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is a dualism not of mind and matter, but of mind and life. … (Olson, manuscript, 13)Thus the Duality of Substances Argument concludes that if expansive brains exist, then we would have an “abominable” duality of distinct thinking and living substances.…”
Section: Animalist Arguments Against Thinking Brains: Olson's New Objmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The arguments against thinking brains were prominent in the paper (Olson, manuscript) that I was given to comment on at the Spindel Conference, but these passages have subsequently been removed by Olson from the published version of the paper (Olson ). I therefore quote the relevant passages below in Part 1 and the reader can find the same arguments published in Olson which I note below.…”
The neuroscience revolution has led many scientists to posit "expansive" or "thinking" brains that instantiate rich psychological properties. As a result, some scientists now even claim you are identical to such a brain. However, Eric Olson has offered new arguments that thinking brains cannot exist due to their intuitively "abominable" implications. After situating the commitment to thinking brains in the wider scientific discussions in which they are posited, I then critically assess Olson's arguments against such entities. Although highlighting an important insight, I show that Olson's objections to the existence of thinking brains fail and that a wider discussion engaging our new empirical findings is actually required in order to resolve the deeper issues.The wider intellectual landscape is marked by resurgent debates over "human nature," and it is also alive with what is now disparagingly termed "neuromania" in explorations of the neurosciences and their findings (Rose and Abi-Rached 2013). Linked to these developments are the increasing cases in which we find neuroscientists, and others, defending what I term the "Expansive Brain view"-namely, the position that we are identical to what I term "expansive" or "thinking" brains that can or do instantiate "rich psychological properties," such as remembering breakfast or fearing skin cancer, etc. 1 Interestingly, philosophical debates about what we are have been almost completely insulated from the waves of findings from the neurosciences and cannot be accused of falling into neuromania-far from it. Virtually no Carl Gillett is Professor of Philosophy at Northern Illinois University. His research areas are the philosophy of mind/psychology, the philosophy of science, and metaphysics. His book Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy is forthcoming from Cambridge University Press. 1 See Gazzaniga 2005, 31 and Panksepp and Biven 2012, for a couple of examples. Vidaloffers a review of such claims of "brainhood." I use the term 'expansive' brain to refer to brains which are taken to instantiate an expanded range of properties, including rich psychology.
“…No organism could ever think or be conscious, and no thinking or conscious being could ever be an organism (except in the derivative sense in which an immaterial substance can “be” an organism). (Olson, manuscript, 13)The first “abominable” implication is that if we accept there are expansive brains, then we must accept that it is metaphysically impossible for animals to have rich psychological properties.…”
Section: Animalist Arguments Against Thinking Brains: Olson's New Objmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…No organism could ever think or be conscious, and no thinking or conscious being could ever be an organism (except in the derivative sense in which an immaterial substance can “be” an organism). (Olson, manuscript, 13)…”
Section: Animalist Arguments Against Thinking Brains: Olson's New Objmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Mind and life—life in the biological sense—are metaphysically incompatible. (Olson, manuscript, 4)The second “abominable” implication is thus that if expansive brains exist, then no living individual has mental properties, and we have a separation between, as Olson puts it, “mind and life.”…”
Section: Animalist Arguments Against Thinking Brains: Olson's New Objmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is a dualism not of mind and matter, but of mind and life. … (Olson, manuscript, 13)Thus the Duality of Substances Argument concludes that if expansive brains exist, then we would have an “abominable” duality of distinct thinking and living substances.…”
Section: Animalist Arguments Against Thinking Brains: Olson's New Objmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The arguments against thinking brains were prominent in the paper (Olson, manuscript) that I was given to comment on at the Spindel Conference, but these passages have subsequently been removed by Olson from the published version of the paper (Olson ). I therefore quote the relevant passages below in Part 1 and the reader can find the same arguments published in Olson which I note below.…”
The neuroscience revolution has led many scientists to posit "expansive" or "thinking" brains that instantiate rich psychological properties. As a result, some scientists now even claim you are identical to such a brain. However, Eric Olson has offered new arguments that thinking brains cannot exist due to their intuitively "abominable" implications. After situating the commitment to thinking brains in the wider scientific discussions in which they are posited, I then critically assess Olson's arguments against such entities. Although highlighting an important insight, I show that Olson's objections to the existence of thinking brains fail and that a wider discussion engaging our new empirical findings is actually required in order to resolve the deeper issues.The wider intellectual landscape is marked by resurgent debates over "human nature," and it is also alive with what is now disparagingly termed "neuromania" in explorations of the neurosciences and their findings (Rose and Abi-Rached 2013). Linked to these developments are the increasing cases in which we find neuroscientists, and others, defending what I term the "Expansive Brain view"-namely, the position that we are identical to what I term "expansive" or "thinking" brains that can or do instantiate "rich psychological properties," such as remembering breakfast or fearing skin cancer, etc. 1 Interestingly, philosophical debates about what we are have been almost completely insulated from the waves of findings from the neurosciences and cannot be accused of falling into neuromania-far from it. Virtually no Carl Gillett is Professor of Philosophy at Northern Illinois University. His research areas are the philosophy of mind/psychology, the philosophy of science, and metaphysics. His book Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy is forthcoming from Cambridge University Press. 1 See Gazzaniga 2005, 31 and Panksepp and Biven 2012, for a couple of examples. Vidaloffers a review of such claims of "brainhood." I use the term 'expansive' brain to refer to brains which are taken to instantiate an expanded range of properties, including rich psychology.
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