Theory of BAR games

Clement, Allen; Napper, Jeff; Li, Harry; Martin, J.-P.; Alvisi, Lorenzo; Dahlin, Mike

doi:10.1145/1281100.1281172

Cited by 21 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 7 publications

(5 reference statements)

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“…k-fault tolerant Nash equilibrium requires that a each agent's strategy is still optimal even if up to k agents behave in an arbitrary fashion [12]. The BAR model has three types of agents: Byzantine, rational, and obedient "altruistic" agents who will follow the given protocol even if it is not rational [8,20]. (k, t)-robustness combines both these directions with the possibility that k agents may behave arbitrarily and t agents may collude [1].…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Manipulating Scrip Systems: Sybils and Collusion

Kash

Friedman

Halpern

2009

Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Abstract. Game-theoretic analyses of distributed and peer-to-peer systems typically use the Nash equilibrium solution concept, but this explicitly excludes the possibility of strategic behavior involving more than one agent. We examine the effects of two types of strategic behavior involving more than one agent, sybils and collusion, in the context of scrip systems where agents provide each other with service in exchange for scrip. Sybils make an agent more likely to be chosen to provide service, which generally makes it harder for agents without sybils to earn money and decreases social welfare. Surprisingly, in certain circumstances it is possible for sybils to make all agents better off. While collusion is generally bad, in the context of scrip systems it actually tends to make all agents better off, not merely those who collude. These results also provide insight into the effects of allowing agents to advertise and loan money. While many extensions of Nash equilibrium have been proposed that address collusion and other issues relevant to distributed and peer-to-peer systems, our results show that none of them adequately address the issues raised by sybils and collusion in scrip systems.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Manipulating Scrip Systems: Sybils and Collusion

Kash

Friedman

Halpern

2009

Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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“…3 Eliaz [28] and later [17,3,35,18,4] consider coalitions in which all of the deviators may possibly be faulty. 3 The inherent difficulty is that no punishment deters a coalition in which all agents are Byzantine.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…On one hand, we consider joint deviations that are harder to deal with than deviations in which all deviators are rational (as in [6,1,5]) because we assume that not all deviators are rational. On the other hand, we offer equilibria that are more credible than known fault tolerant equilibrium because we consider new realistic system settings of infinitely repeated games in which not all deviators are faulty (as in [28,17,3,35,18,4]). One may think about a subordinate agent as a faulty one.…”

Section: Costs Of Games With Subsystem Takeoversmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The reason is that a subordinate agent does not selfishly promote its own benefit, because it is controlled by another selfish (non-faulty) agent, i.e., the coordinator. However, subordinate agents do not present an arbitrary behavior (as in [28,17,3,35,18,4]). …”

Section: Costs Of Games With Subsystem Takeoversmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The research path of BAR fault tolerance systems [4] studies cooperative services that span multiple administrative domains, such as: a backup service [3], a peer-to-peer data streaming application [35], and Synchronous Terminating Reliable Broadcast [17]. BAR fault tolerance systems consider a minority of Byzantine computers that deviate arbitrarily and a single selfish deviator (out of the set of all selfish-computers).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Strategies for repeated games with subsystem takeovers implementable by deterministic and self-stabilising automata

Schiller

Spirakis

Philippas

2011

IJAACS

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Systems of selfish-computers, such as the Internet, are subject to transient faults due to hardware/software temporal malfunctions; just as the society is subjected to human mistakes due to a moment of weakness. Game theory uses punishment for deterring improper behavior. Due to faults, selfish-computers may punish well-behaved ones. This is one of the key motivations for forgiveness that follows any effective and credible punishment. Therefore, unplanned punishments must be proven to have ceased in order to avoid infinite cycles of unsynchronized behavior of "tit for tat".We investigate another aspect of selfish-computer systems. We consider the possibility of subsystem takeover, say, by the use of hostile malware. The takeover may lead to joint deviations coordinated by an arbitrary selfish-computer that controls an unknown group of subordinate computers.We present strategies that deter the coordinator (and its subordinates) from deviating in infinitely repeated games. We construct deterministic and finite automata that implement these strategies with optimal complexity. Moreover, we prove that all unplanned punishments eventually cease by showing that the automata can recover from transient faults.

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Building Regular Registers with Rational Malicious Servers and Anonymous Clients

Pozzo

Bonomi

Lazzeretti

et al. 2017

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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The paper addresses the problem of emulating a regular register in a synchronous distributed system where clients invoking read() and write() operations are anonymous while server processes maintaining the state of the register may be compromised by rational adversaries (i.e., a server might behave as rational malicious Byzantine process). We first model our problem as a Bayesian game between a client and a rational malicious server where the equilibrium depends on the decisions of the malicious server (behave correctly and not be detected by clients vs returning a wrong register value to clients with the risk of being detected and then excluded by the computation). We prove such equilibrium exists and finally we design a protocol implementing the regular register that forces the rational malicious server to behave correctly.

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Theory of BAR games

Cited by 21 publications

References 7 publications

Manipulating Scrip Systems: Sybils and Collusion

Manipulating Scrip Systems: Sybils and Collusion

Strategies for repeated games with subsystem takeovers implementable by deterministic and self-stabilising automata

Building Regular Registers with Rational Malicious Servers and Anonymous Clients

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