Manipulating Scrip Systems: Sybils and Collusion

Kash, Ian A.; Friedman, Eric; Halpern, Joseph Y.

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_4

Cited by 6 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…The authors prove the existence of a non-trivial Nash equilibrium at which homogeneous agents play a well-behaved strategy. Kash et al [31] extend the scrip system for heterogeneous users and [32] extends this model by studying the effect of collusion.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing Heterogeneous Datacenters with Tokens

Zahedi

Fan

Lee

2018

ACM Trans. Archit. Code Optim.

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Ensuring fairness in a system with scarce, preferred resources requires time sharing. We consider a heterogeneous system with a few "big" and many "small" processors. We allocate heterogeneous processors using a novel token mechanism, which frames the allocation problem as a repeated game. At each round, users request big processors and spend a token if their request is granted. We analyze the game and optimize users' strategies to produce an equilibrium. In equilibrium, allocations balance performance and fairness. Our mechanism outperforms classical, fair mechanisms by 1.7×, on average, in performance gains, and is competitive with a performance maximizing mechanism. CCS Concepts: • Software and its engineering → Power management; • Information systems → Data centers; • Social and professional topics → Pricing and resource allocation; • Theory of computation → Algorithmic mechanism design; • Computing methodologies → Modeling methodologies;

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing Heterogeneous Datacenters with Tokens

Zahedi

Fan

Lee

2018

ACM Trans. Archit. Code Optim.

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“…Kash, Friedman, and Halpern [29] offer an alternative vision of collusion and Sybil attacks, where the formation of coalitions, be them formed by rational users or by mock users (as is the case for Sybil agents), can have a positive effect on the system's overall welfare. [29] The system is modeled with n agents, each of which can ask for a service and provide it, if he has enough capabilities.…”

Section: B Game Theory Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…[29] The system is modeled with n agents, each of which can ask for a service and provide it, if he has enough capabilities. The system is described as a tuple (T, f, n, m), whose components are explained in Tab.…”

Section: B Game Theory Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Collusion in peer-to-peer systems

Ciccarelli

Cigno

2011

Computer Networks

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Abstract-Peer-to-peer systems have reached a widespread use, ranging from academic and industrial applications to home entertainment. The key advantage of this paradigm lies in its scalability and flexibility, consequences of the participants sharing their resources for the common welfare.Security in such systems is a desirable goal. For example, when mission-critical operations or bank transactions are involved, their effectiveness strongly depends on the perception that users have about the system dependability and trustworthiness. A major threat to the security of these systems is the phenomenon of collusion. Peers can be selfish colluders, when they try to fool the system to gain unfair advantages over other peers, or malicious, when their purpose is to subvert the system or disturb other users.The problem, however, has received so far only a marginal attention by the research community. While several solutions exist to counter attacks in peer-to-peer systems, very few of them are meant to directly counter colluders and their attacks. Reputation, micro-payments, and concepts of game theory are currently used as the main means to obtain fairness in the usage of the resources.Our goal is to provide an overview of the topic by examining the key issues involved. We measure the relevance of the problem in the current literature and the effectiveness of existing philosophies against it, to suggest fruitful directions in the further development of the field.

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“…The Capitol Hill Baby Sitting Co-Op [28], a concrete scrip system created by a group of parents working on Capitol Hill, faced a recession and a monetary crash due to its monetary policy. Several researchers further studied the dynamics of scrip systems, based on these issues [14], [20], [21]. Among other results, they show that agents following threshold strategies led to a nontrivial Nash equilibrium.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

One-to-n scrip systems for cooperative privacy-enhancing technologies

Humbert

Manshaei

Hubaux

2011

2011 49th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton)

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Scrip is a generic term for any substitute for real currency; it can be converted into goods or services sold by the issuer. In the classic scrip system model, one agent is helped by another in return for one unit of scrip. In this paper, we present an upgraded model, the one-to-n scrip system, where users need to find n agents to accomplish a single task. We provide a detailed analytical evaluation of this system based on a game-theoretic approach. We establish that a nontrivial Nash equilibrium exists in such systems under certain conditions. We study the effect of n on the equilibrium, on the distribution of scrip in the system and on its performance. Among other results, we show that the system designer should increase the average amount of scrip in the system when n increases in order to optimize its efficiency. We also explain how our new one-to-n scrip system can be applied to foster cooperation in two privacy-enhancing applications.

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Manipulating Scrip Systems: Sybils and Collusion

Cited by 6 publications

References 21 publications

Managing Heterogeneous Datacenters with Tokens

Managing Heterogeneous Datacenters with Tokens

Collusion in peer-to-peer systems

One-to-n scrip systems for cooperative privacy-enhancing technologies

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