The Way Things Were*

Sanson, David; Caplan, Ben

doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00357.x

Cited by 69 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 25 publications

(22 reference statements)

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“…Like others (e.g. Baron (2013), Merricks (2007: 133, 137), Sanson and Caplan (2010)), we think talk about the past, including past-tensed sentences, should be understood as about the past. A Bourne-style semantics denies us that; talk about the past winds-up being about surrogate grounds.…”

Section: The Supremacy Of a 'Bourne-style' Semantics?mentioning

confidence: 80%

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Nefarious Presentism

Tallant

Ingram

2015

Phil. Quart.

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Keywords: presentism; truth-making; the truth-maker objection to presentism. 1.It is a period of civil war (for presentists)Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, 1 face a familiar problem concerning truths about the past. 2 It seems presentists believe each of the following: (i) presentism; (ii) truth-maker theory (truths about the past are 'made true' by some element of our ontology); and, (iii) there are (evidence-transcendent and objective) truths about the past. 3 For obvious reasons, presentists will not be inclined to give up on presentism. The claim that truths about the past are 'made true' by some element of our ontology is popular and well-defended. 4 And, so long as they wish to avoid flying in the face of common sense, presentists must agree that there are truths about the past, e.g. that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. (We metaphysicians defer to historians on this matter.) Hence, is true, 5 and so must have a truth-maker. But note: Caesar is not a present object. And so, it seems, there is a tension.Presentists should-but cannot-locate truth-makers for true propositions about the past.

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Section: The Supremacy Of a 'Bourne-style' Semantics?mentioning

confidence: 80%

“…But, although still only a minority, we think the nefarious presentists are on the march. Each of Baia (2012), Sanson & Caplan (2010), and Tallant (2009Tallant ( , 2010 defend views according to which no truth-makers are required for truths about the past. To our shame, we fear we must join the march.…”

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confidence: 99%

Nefarious Presentism

Tallant

Ingram

2015

Phil. Quart.

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“…There is another reason for the presentist to deny (TM1b)*. Sanson and Caplan (2010) invite us to consider the true proposition, A: Arnold was pale. They deny that presentists should posit presently existing truth-makers, such as Lucretian properties, for true propositions like A.…”

Section: Stoneham On the Definition Of Presentismmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Since this is a case where a proposition, \p[ is about what does not exist-\p[is a proposition about the past-we should not be looking for truth-makers for \p[. The second reason to reject this kind of approach is that, following Sanson and Caplan (2010), presently existing truth-makers look to be poor candidates for the role of explaining why past-tense propositions are true. Because of this, I do not think that the presentist should endorse (TM4d).…”

Section: Stoneham On the Definition Of Presentismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Defining Existence Presentism

Tallant

2013

Erkenn

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“…3 The seriousness of this charge is discussed in Tallant (2009). Our preferred reason for rejecting Lucretianism is given by Sanson & Caplan (2010) and Merricks (2007: 136-137): what we might crudely call the "aboutness" objection. 4 Being-polka-dotted is just one example of an SDP, a colour-distributional property.…”

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confidence: 99%